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The Fourth Amendment at Home
THOMAS P. CROCKER*

A refuge, a domain ofpersonalprivacy, and the seat offamilial life, the home holds
a specialplace in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Supreme Court opinions are
replete with statements affirming the special status of the home. Fourth Amendment
text places special emphasis on securing protectionsfor the home in addition to
persons, papers, and effects against unwarrantedgovernment intrusion. Beyond
the FourthAmendment, the home has a unique place within constitutionalstructure.
The home receives privacyprotections in addition to sheltering other constitutional
values protectedby the Due Process Clause and the FirstAmendment. For example,
under the Due Process Clause, the Constitutionprotects the intimate relationships
andfamily life that constitute a home. As a physical structure, the home harbors
private, domestic life. Constitutionalprotections of the household, however, extend
beyond the enclosing walls of a physical structure. These intimate features of
household privacy are necessary conditions for the fulfillment of what Justice
Kennedy calls "dimensions offreedom" that extend outward into public life.
This Article demonstrates that because the home's playing this role is a necessary
conditionfor the possibilityof republican self-government, the Fourth Amendment's
protectionfor householdprivacy is therefore also a structuralcheck on federal and
state power. With rapidly changing technology that can alter the balance between
the government and its citizens, the home's structuralrole within the Constitution's
system of separatedpowers is an overlookedfeature of the Fourth Amendment. And
as home personal assistant devices, doorbell security systems, and "smart"
appliances all proliferate, so too do police requests to access stored digital
information about the most intimate confines of interpersonallife. Once courts better
recognize the home's structural role, analysis of law enforcement access to such
stored datawill extend beyond questions of knowing exposure or third-partysharing
to encompass questions about the systemic effects of pervasivepolice access to such
data upon republican self-government. Conventionaljudicial doctrines that apply
constitutionalrights unmooredfrom their broaderstructuralroles risk undervaluing
privacy while upsetting the balance of constitutional structure. To avoid this
overlooked consequence, courts need conceptual clarity about the role the home
plays in both the Fourth Amendment and within constitutionalstructure. Rather than
abandoningthe idea ofprivacy in the face of overwhelming informationalexposure
and advancingtechnology, we can strengthen it by seeing how it protects broader
claims to liberty while preserving an overlookedfeature of constitutionalstructure
resident in the home. This Article argues that the home provides a way of organizing
aparadigmfor privacyprotections that extends not only to the confines of a physical
home, but also to the person in the public sphere. By linking the libertiesof the people
with privacy of the home, the Fourth Amendment plays an essential structuralrole
in protecting the household from domination by government institutions and
officials. In this way, FourthAmendment protectionsfor the home function as much
to promote politicalvalues as personal ones, thereby providing a structural check
on executive power.

* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION

A refuge, a domain of personal privacy, and the seat of familial life, the home
holds a special place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Supreme Court opinions
are replete with statements affirming the special status of the home, for "physical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed."1 Other opinions affirm "the ancient adage that a man's
house is his castle," and that "[t]he poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to
all the forces of the Crown." 2 Still others speak of the Fourth Amendment by
affirming the proposition that "[a]t the very core stands the right of a man to retreat
3
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."
4
Many more expressions of like kind populate the pages of the U.S. Reports.
Fourth Amendment text places special emphasis on securing protections for the
home-in addition to persons, papers, and effects-against unwarranted government
intrusion.5 Among these listed sites of protection, Justice Scalia explained that "when
it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals."6 But in the wake
of the 1967 decision by the Warren Court in Katz v. United States, judicial doctrine
emphasized a more portable and evanescent "expectation of privacy"-not
location-as the core meaning of the Fourth Amendment's protections against
searches and seizures.' As the Court explained in Katz, the Fourth Amendment

1. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
2. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (citation omitted).
3. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citing Entick v. Carrington
(1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807; 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1066 (C.P.); then citing Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886)).
4. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (stressing "the overriding
respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins
of the Republic"). But see Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism
in the FourthAmendment, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 905, 912-13 (2010) (arguing that the special

status of the home has been used to lower expectations of privacy outside the home).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013).
7. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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protects "people, not places."8 Nonetheless, the special role of the home and its
relation to a "right of the people" have not been displaced. In a 2013 decision focused
on a warrantless search of a home, Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that "[t]he Katz
reasonable-expectations test 'has been added to, not substitutedfor,' the traditional
property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment." 9 This "property-based
understanding" places the home at the center of the Fourth Amendment.
Beyond the Fourth Amendment, the home has a unique place within constitutional
structure. The home receives privacy protections in addition to sheltering other
constitutional values protected by the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment.
For example, under the Due Process Clause, the Constitution protects the intimate
relationships and family life that constitute a home.10 As a physical structure, the
home harbors private, domestic life. Constitutional protections of the household
extend beyond the enclosing walls of a physical structure. These intimate features of
household privacy are necessary conditions for the fulfilment of what Justice
Kennedy calls "dimensions of freedom" in public life. 11 As a political structure, the
home organizes the necessary conditions for political self-determination. In this way,
Americans carry their homes with them into the public. Participation in public
discourse, a central value protected by the First Amendment, likewise begins with
the assimilation and production of ideas contained in "private papers" that the Fourth
Amendment protects against unwarranted government search and seizure.1 2
Constitutional structure is built upon the specific role of the home, explicitly
protected against government occupation, and functionally placed as the reserve for

8. Id.
9. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 409 (2012)).
10. For example, the Court concluded that "the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition." Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); see also Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972).
11. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015) ("The generations that wrote and
ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent
of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter
protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.").
12. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-58 (1964); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971); Snyderv. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); see also Robert
Post, ParticipatoryDemocracy andFree Speech, 97 VA. L. REv. 477 (2011); Robert C. Post,
The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic

Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv. 601 (1990). Onthe overlap
between these Fourth and First Amendment protections, see Neil M. Richards, Intellectual
Privacy, 87 TEx. L. REv. 387 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, The FirstAmendment as Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 112 (2007); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational
Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1426-27 (2000) ("A robust and

varied debate on matters of public concern requires the opportunity to experiment with selfdefinition in private, and (if one desires) to keep distinct social, commercial, and political
associations separate from one another.").
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"domestic Tranquility." 13 This Article demonstrates that because playing this role is
a necessary condition for the possibility of republican self-government, the Fourth
Amendment's protection for household privacy is therefore also a structural check
on federal and state power. With rapidly changing technology that can alter the
balance between the government and its citizens, the home's structural role within
the Constitution's system of separated powers is an overlooked feature of the Fourth
Amendment. And as home personal assistant devices, doorbell security systems, and
"smart" appliances all proliferate, so too do police requests to access stored digital
information about the most intimate confines of interpersonal life." Once courts
better recognize the home's structural role, analysis of law enforcement access to
such stored data will extend beyond questions of knowing exposure to encompass
questions about the systemic effects of pervasive police access to such data upon
republican self-government. This Article argues that the home provides a way of
organizing a paradigm for privacy protections that extends not only to the confines
of a physical home, but also to the person in the public sphere."
As others have argued, however, placing the home at the center of our
understanding of privacy risks devaluing privacy in other places and contexts. 16 If
the home is the paradigm of privacy, then in important respects all things that are not
the home-persons in public, personal relationships, communications, cars, bags,
electronic equipment, stored data, and so much more-must receive a lessened
measure of privacy. When people step into public spaces, they are subject to different
Fourth Amendment protections and rules, shedding the privacy household intimacies
afford. For example, under the Supreme Court's public observation and third-party
doctrines, neither surveillance of one's movements on public streets nor acquisition
of data one has shared with others implicates Fourth Amendment protections. 17 As
the facts of United States v. Karo illustrate, monitoring the public movements on
roadways of persons and objects under investigation by radio beacon does not

13. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
14. See, e.g., Kayla Epstein, Police Think Amazon's Alexa May Have Information on a

Fatal Stabbing
Case,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
3,
2019,
8:28
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11 /02/police-think-amazons-alexa-mayhave-information-fatal-stabbing-case/ [perma.cc/L8FV-4CY2]; see also Drew Harwell,
Doorbell-CameraFirm Ring Has Partneredwith 400 Police Forces, Extending Surveillance
Concerns,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
28,
2019,
6:53
PM),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/28/doorbell-camera-firm-ring-haspartnered-with-police-forces-extending-surveillance-reach/
[https://perma.cc/4R6R-N7PC]
(revealing police networks connected to doorbell security systems).
15. On the link between persons and property, see Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
16. See Stern, supra note 4; see also David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz,
and Common Law, 72 Miss. L.J. 143, 192 (2002).

17. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) ("A person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another."); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding no
expectation of privacy against public observation by a helicopter hovering 450 feet above
curtilage); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (no expectation of privacy in
information shared with a third party). But see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206
(2018) (holding warrant required to access historical cell-site data held by a third party).
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implicate protections against unreasonable searches until the signaling device enters
the home.18
Such constitutional divergence creates a dilemma. By negative implication, to
emphasize household privacy is to invite an overall loss of privacy in all other aspects
of Americans' lives. 19 But to abandon the home as a privacy paradigm would seem
to leave privacy unmoored from any place in which it can be most clearly manifested.
Moreover, when Americans invite technology into their homes, they may set in
motion a conflict between an absence of privacy protection under the third-party
doctrine and the paradigm of privacy under the household-privacy doctrine. 20 After
all, they are sharing household intimacies with a third party, which, according to the
Supreme Court, can defeat any further expectation of privacy. 21 Mechanical
application of existing doctrine could yield such aberrant results. 22 But when
considering how Americans carry aspects of their household privacy into public by
way of the technology they use, the Supreme Court hesitated to conclude that they
shed their Fourth Amendment protections. In Riley v. California,the Court reasoned
that although persons are subject to searches of their physical person incident to arrest
in public, a warrant is necessary to search the contents of their smartphones on which
police might find many of the features of household privacy. 23 This privacyprotective rule comes amidst a number of additional cases that consider the special
status of the home in opposition to policing pressure to have unfettered access to
interiors, porches, and driveways.24 As a result, the home is on the frontlines of the

18. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
19.

See, e.g., Stern, supra note 4, at 909.

20. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (establishing that individuals
"assume the risk" when sharing information with third parties that will convey information to
the police); Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of

Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1635 (1987) ("A view of the world that recognizes the
essential interconnectedness of people and the importance of intimacy and sharing is foreign
to the atomistic social theory underlying the Court's present doctrine."); Daniel J. Solove,
Fourth Amendment Codification andProfessorKerr'sMisguided Callfor JudicialDeference,

74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005) ("The third party doctrine presents one of the most
serious threats to privacy in the digital age."); see also Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the
(Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the
Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975 (2007).

21. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) ("It is well settled that when an individual reveals private
information to another, he assumes the risk that . . the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
governmental use of the now non-private information.").
22. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 113 (2008) ("[T]he
Stranger Principle is completely untenable. It implies that, once an individual has exposed
information to a third party, the government may seize that information-with or without that
third party's assistance. And that implication would spell the end of the Fourth Amendment
almost altogether.").
23.

573 U.S. 373 (2014).

24. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (interiors); Florida v. Jardines, 569
U.S. 1 (2013) (porches); Collinsv. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018) (driveways).
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constitutional tension that exists among preventative policing, new technologies, and
5
privacy.2
This Article argues that the model of household privacy carried into public in
Riley provides a basis for applying the principle of household primacy to protect
greater privacy in public. This claim is further bolstered by linking the liberty
protected in personal relationships by due process to the locus of personal life in the
home. 26 By linking the liberties of the people with privacy of the home, the Fourth
Amendment plays an essential structural role in protecting the household from
domination by government institutions and officials.
In this way, Fourth Amendment protections for the home function as much to
promote political values as personal ones, thereby providing a structural check on
executive power. Household privacy is not merely a personal right against a police
officer's intrusion. Rather, the home shelters a space in which the freedom "to think
as you will" 27 under the First Amendment is interconnected to "the right to be let
alone" 28 under the Fourth, supporting the distinctive structural role that "the People"
play in self-government. 29 Such a role is an often overlooked purpose of the Fourth
Amendment-to provide a structural check on executive power through a rights
limitation. This structural check, I argue, is located in the home as an institution. In
this way, the Fourth Amendment's protection for the home serves an overall
Madisonian anti-tyranny purpose.3 0
By emphasizing the home, I aim to show how and why the Fourth Amendment
might better protect privacy by recognizing the institutional role the home plays
within constitutional structure. When persons cross the threshold of their homes, they
need not enter a radically altered Fourth Amendment world-one in which unfettered
surveillance can follow them without limit until they reenter their household
sanctuary. As the Supreme Court explained in a case holding that access to historical
cell-cite information constitutes a search requiring a warrant, "[a] person does not
surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere."31
Rather, the protection afforded smartphones against rules otherwise permitting
searches incident to arrest in Riley v. California suggests a model for how to think
about household privacy in public.3 2 Similarly, the presence of technology that

25. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (citing Riley, 573
U.S. at 395) ("A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into
private residences, doctor's offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing
locales."); United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Kyllo,
533 U.S. at 40) ("[T]he DEA's use of the cell-site simulator revealed 'details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion."').
26. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After

Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2009).
27. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
28. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. This role has a modern history in which the citizen's relation to privacy has shifted.
See SARAI E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA (2018).
30. See Aziz Z. Huq, How the FourthAmendment and the SeparationofPowers Rise (and
Fall) Together, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 139 (2016).

31. Carpenterv. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
32.

573 U.S. 373 (2014).
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interacts with third-party providers capable of having a "presence" within the home
does not convert the home into a public place. Conventional judicial doctrines that
apply constitutional rights unmoored from their broader structural roles risk
undervaluing privacy, while upsetting the balance of constitutional structure. It is
more typical to emphasize the institutional separation of Congress, courts, and the
executive and thereby ignore the further institutional balance "the People" provide,
in part, by retaining the right to household privacy. Because the "people themselves"
constitute the foundation of republican government, 33 this household privacy is a
necessary condition for exercising their public role and creates a separate
institutional structure in which the executive cannot become a dominant presence.
To avoid this overlooked consequence, we need conceptual clarity about the role
the home plays in both the Fourth Amendment and within constitutional structure.
Rather than abandoning the idea of privacy in the face of overwhelming
informational exposure, we can strengthen it by seeing how it advances broader
claims to liberty while preserving an overlooked feature of constitutional structure
resident in the home. How we imagine the structure of Fourth Amendment rights in
light of the social, cultural, and political role the home plays forms the unavoidable
background to any doctrinal developments.34 Seeing how concepts of the home and
its institutional role within judicial opinions connect to political practice and
technological change make possible further normative claims about what shape
constitutional doctrine should take.
Fourth Amendment theory determines governing practice. A Fourth Amendment
analysis focused on reforming and applying the third-party doctrine or the public
observation and exposure doctrines as issues of individual rights is too narrow a
reform project to meet the substantial challenges to privacy that technology presents.
Any reform project must also engage both the purposes of constitutional protections
and the ways these purposes converge across doctrines to provide more substantial
conceptual and theoretical grounding. Fourth Amendment scholarship is all too often
focused on a dichotomy between facilitating and regulating policing practices and
protecting privacy. 35 A doctrinal debate between police and privacy often fails to ask
the further question of "why privacy?" 36 By contrast, for example, First Amendment
scholarship and jurisprudence asks "why speech?" when looking for a theory to guide

33.

See, e.g.,

1

BRUCE ACKERMAN,

WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS

165 (1991)

("[D]efining a higher lawmaking process through which future generations might concentrate
their political energies to make fundamental law in the name of We the People of the United
States.").
34. See CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 24 (2004).
35. See, e.g.,

Orin

S. Kerr, FourModels of FourthAmendment Protection, 60 STAN. L.

REv. 503 (2007). This dichotomy also reflects ambivalence about the relationship between
police and democracy. See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REv.
1699 (2005) (examining the changing relationship between democratic practices and police
practices).
36. See David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy
and the FourthAmendment, 102 CALIF. L. REv. 1069, 1113-20 (2014) (developing theory of

"privacy as refuge").
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free speech doctrine.3 7 Theory becomes all the more important in light of the
increased surveillance we all confront. Emerging technologies and changing social
media practices combine to expose us all to both private and public surveillance,
implicating the scope and structure of state power that the Fourth Amendment
addresses. 38
Pervasive police surveillance creates the prospect of dystopian constitutional
consequences that the Fourth Amendment seeks to forestall. 39 It might not be
hyperbolic for a federal judge to admonish regarding public location tracking that
"[s]ome day, soon, we may wake up and find we're living in Oceania."4 To so
awaken, however, much in the structure of government will have changed through
the adaptation of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to pervasive police surveillance.
Technology and social practice create adaptive pressure. Exposure occurs through
the extensive data trails we leave through our transactions, communications, and
social media practices." We become our own digital selves whom others can know
better than ourselves. Technology is rapidly producing an "Internet of Things" that
will further monitor our daily lives in the guise of improving our well-being. 4 2 These

37. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Use Your Words: On the "Speech" in "Freedom of
Speech," 116 MICH. L. REV. 667 (2018); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment
Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?,
78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284 (1983); see also OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996);
SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW (2014).

38. As Bernard Harcourt argues, these changes produce a new "expository power": "We
live today in a new political and social condition that is radically transforming our relations to
each other, our political community, and ourselves: a new virtual transparence that is
dramatically reconfiguring relations of power throughout society, that is redrawing our social
landscape and political possibilities, that is producing a dramatically new circulation of power
in society." BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
15 (2015).
39. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 762 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances."); see
also Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARv. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013)

("[O]ur society lacks an understanding of why (and when) government surveillance is
harmful."); Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, PoliticalProcess Theory, and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1723 (2014) ("' [P]anvasive' [surveillance] . .

capture [s] the idea that modern government's efforts at keeping tabs on the citizenry routinely
and randomly reach across huge numbers of people, most of whom are innocent of any
wrongdoing.").
40. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting).
41.

See HARCOURT, supra note 38, at 13-15; DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:

TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004).

42. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The "Smart" FourthAmendment, 102 CORNELL
L. REV. 547 (2017); Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, The Internet of Heirlooms and
Disposable Things, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 581, 582-83 (2016); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the
Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and
Consent, 93 TEx. L. REV. 85 (2014); see also Ian Bogost, Home Monitoring Will Soon Monitor
You,
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
11,
2016),

https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/11/home-monitoring-will-soonmonitor-you/507263/ [https://perma.cc/HBR5-MVEL]; Arielle Pardes, The Wired Guide to
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technology-enhanced social practices provide new ways of living and interacting,
and thus new occasions for us to choose such exposure. Even if for convenience we
choose to participate in practices that create and expose our digital selves, we do not
at the same time choose a radically different constitutional regime-at least not
directly and knowingly.
A problem arises when judicial doctrines lead us to think that by adopting new
technologies and social practices that we thereby have also chosen a different
structural relation to state power-that we have acceded to an expository power that
changes constitutional limits and structures. We make possible a new "national
surveillance state." 4 3 The possibility of such change is reflected in the National
Security Agency's endeavor to "collect it all" as an approach to surveillance in the
name of making us more secure.4 4 In collecting all telephone metadata on all
Americans-such as the time, duration, location, and number dialed-the NSA
justified its actions under a 1970s Supreme Court opinion that held there is no
expectation of privacy in the numbers persons dial because they knowingly expose
such information to third parties in order to complete the call.4 5 In reviewing the
program, District Judge Leon rejected this application of the third-party doctrine,
reasoning that "the almost-Orwellian technology that enables the Government to
store and analyze the phone metadata of every telephone user in the United States is
unlike anything that could have been conceived in 1979."46 To contemplate such
dystopian Orwellian consequences is not to become a "Henny Penny," decrying dire

the Internet of Things, WIRED (Feb. 10, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-

guide-internet-of-things/ [https://perma.cc/UZ2J-QEP8].
43.

Jack M. Balkin, Essay, The Constitutionin the NationalSurveillance State, 93 MINN.

L. REV. 1 (2008).
44. Former NSA Director, Alexander Keith's motto was "collect it all." Ellen Nakashima
& Joby Warrick, For NSA Chief Terrorist Threat Drives Passion to "CollectIt All," WASH.
POST (July 14, 2013) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-nsa-chiefterrorist-threat-drives-passion-to-collect-it-all/2013/07/14/3d26ef80-ea49-1 le2-a301ea5a8116d211_story.html [https://perma.cc/G7R6-NYRJ]; see also GLENN GREENWALD, NO
PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 96-98

(2014).
45. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979). The Obama Administration
defended the bulk telephone metadata program in a white paper, arguing that Smith v.
Maryland applied, and that "any arguable privacy intrusion arising from the collection of
telephony metadata would be outweighed by the critical public interest in identifying
connections between terrorist operatives and thwarting terrorist plots, rendering the program
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER:
BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT

ACT 19 (2013), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2013/images/08/09/administration.white.paper

.section.2 15.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RJN-EDB7].
46. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33 (D.D.C. 2013). By contrast, Judge Pauley,
writing from the Southern District of New York, upheld the practice, mechanically applying
Smith v. Maryland. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The Second
Circuit then reversed. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
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consequences from limited evidence, but to reason within a tradition of American
constitutionalism aimed at avoiding tyranny.4 7
Rather than focusing on how the Fourth Amendment regulates police practice,
this Article's inquiry focuses on how household privacy structures federal power. By
shifting the focus, we can learn a lot about the constitutional scope of policing
practices through the lens of structure and design, while avoiding a conventional
error of thinking that the Fourth Amendment-anachronistically, for an institution
that did not exist at ratification-does nothing more than provide rules to govern
policing practice.4 8
This Article focuses on how the home provides a way of organizing a conception
of privacy that sorts power between executive officers and the sovereign people. In
so doing, the Fourth Amendment's structural role is bolstered by similar protections
for household intimacy under the Due Process Clause and freedom of thought and
speech under the First Amendment.4 9 By acknowledging these convergent
constitutional values, the institutional household provides an analytic approach that
is both holistic and systemic in considering the effects of government access and
power over the ways Americans are informationally exposed. Moreover, in a
doctrinal balance that weighs the state's claimed necessity to exploit informational
exposure against the individual's claim to privacy, the individual is too easily
overcome. Recognition of this power asymmetry-and constitutional imbalance-is
evident in Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in the GPS tracking case, UnitedStates
v. Jones, where she reasoned:
The net result is that GPS monitoring-by making available at a relatively
low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any
person whom the government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to
track-may "alter the relationship between citizen and government in a
way that is inimical to democratic society.""

47. See Thomas P. Crocker, Dystopian Constitutionalism, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593
(2015). But see ERIC A. POSNER

& ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE

MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 176-205 (2011) (arguing against a constitutionalism they label

"tyrannophobia").
48. The first modern police force did not arise until 1829 in London, organized by Sir
John Peel. Police forces in major U.S. cities were not formed until even later in the nineteenth
century. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Shapingthe Eighteenth-CenturyCriminal Trial: A View

from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 55 (1983) (discussing consequences of the fact
that London lacked an organized police force until "Sir Robert Peel's Metropolitan Police Act
of 1829 founded the 'bobbies"'); DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN UNDERWORLD:
THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE

1800-1887

(1979).

See generallyBARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION (2017).

49. Although lacking a developed jurisprudence, and seemingly anachronistic itself, the
Third Amendment similarly focuses on protecting the home against the state becoming a
dominant presence. U.S. CONST. amend. III (prohibiting the quartering of troops in homes).
50. 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F. 3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
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The home as institution plays this structural role of maintaining the separation
between citizens and government, necessary for democratic self-determination.
Recognizing the home's role within constitutional structure also helps make sense
of the analytic tension within the Fourth Amendment between property-based
protections and privacy-centric rationales. This tension is one source of the claim
that in choosing new social practices through which we expose ourselves to others
we also choose to forego constitutional protection. Prior to Katz, the Court employed
the law of trespass as a guide to the Fourth Amendment's scope. But Katz made clear
that the Fourth Amendment protected "people not places," shifting analytic focus to
the expectations of privacy persons might have. 1 But as the Court emphasized in
cases like Floridav. Jardinesand United States v. Jones, the privacy approach added
to the property approach, suggesting an analysis that begins with the physical
structure of the home and extends outwards to personal interactions in public space. 2
Scholars and courts alike have largely overlooked the implications of this dynamic.
Rather than drawing a firm and bright line at the threshold of the home between the
private inside and the public outside, the Court's dual approach-protecting both
property and expectations-opens up the possibility of protecting household privacy
outside the home, particularly when doing so promotes a structural end. The latter
implication is not one the Court emphasizes but is inherent in the place the home
occupies within constitutional structure, giving greater analytic coherence to Fourth
Amendment protections. The state's emerging expository power can be checked by
the institutional home's role in constitutional structure.
In what follows, Part I examines how the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasizes
the special sanctity of the home under the Fourth Amendment. Such reasoning takes
the home to constitute a privacy paradigm even beyond the threshold. As paradigm,
however, there is a risk of being analytically trapped in a "privacy prison," for
everything not the home, not secret, and therefore shared in public becomes exposed.
The way out of this "privacy prison" is to recognize the institutional role the home
plays beyond providing private shelter. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's opinion
in Riley v. Calforniato see how the home paradigm extends to public activities. This
reasoning survives countervailing exigency doctrines to solidify a Fourth
Amendment purpose of protecting the home because of its distinctive institutional
role within constitutional structure. Part III demonstrates how due process liberty and
First Amendment free speech converge with the Fourth Amendment to establish the
home's distinctive constitutional role. And Part IV argues in conclusion that the
home's structural role can aid in reimagining Fourth Amendment protections against
structural aggrandizement by executive officials, aided by new in-home
technologies, into zones of democratic self-determination.
I. THE HOME AS PRIVACY PARADIGM
The home occupies a central place within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
"Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth

51. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
52. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 409 ("[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
been added to, not substitutedfor, the common-law trespassory test." (emphasis in original)).
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Amendment is directed," 3 the Court explained in response to warrantless domestic
surveillance conducted by government officials under the guise of national security.
As the Court also made clear, "when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home
is first among equals."" Indeed, "[a]t the Amendment's 'very core' stands 'the right
of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."'" 5 When compared to other physical places, the Court
emphasized that "[i]n none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home."5 6 Such
attention to the physical dimensions of the home might seem to stand in some
contrast to the Court's claim in Katz that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."5 7 But the Court clarified in
Jardinesthat the Katz expectations of privacy analysis does not alter the longstanding
understanding that the home is special under the Fourth Amendment.
The home's place of constitutional protection is also reflected in the Court's
58
citation to eighteenth-century English cases, such as Entick v. Carrington
and
59
Wilkes v. Wood, which provide an English jurisprudential foundation for the Fourth
Amendment. 60 In these seditious libel cases, king's officials entered homes looking
for paper evidence without a warrant. John Wilkes was a member of parliament who
published tracts critical of the Crown under the name The North Briton. The
Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, issued a general warrant which was used to search
Wilkes's home, as well as the homes of a number of his associates, looking for papers
to incriminate them in the crime of seditious libel. When Wilkes sued for trespass,
Judge Pratt, who later became Lord Camden, wrote: "If such a power is truly invested
in a Secretary of State, and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the
person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the
liberty of the subject." 61 Taken as a claim about liberty, this opinion's reasoning and
consequences (checking the power of the Crown) have been widely recognized as
forming the background against which the Fourth Amendment was written, as the
Supreme Court noted in its 1886 case Boyd v. United States.62 Implicit in this

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013).
Id. (quoting Silvermanv. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
(1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807; 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P.).
(1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489; 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (C.P.).

60.

For historical overview see WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS

AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791 (2009). This history is recounted as background to the
Fourth Amendment in many places. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth
Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 303, 345-50 (2010); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the
OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547, 562-70 (1999); William J. Stuntz, The
Substantive Origins of CriminalProcedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 396-404 (1995); AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 13 (1997).

61. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498; 19 Howell's State Trials at 1167.
62. 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) ("[E]vents which took place in England immediately
following the argument about writs of assistance in Boston, were fresh in the memories of
those who achieved our independence and established our form of government.").
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limitation on the Crown's power to ransack a home is also recognition that not only
is individual liberty at stake but that liberty serves a structural purpose. If government
action subverts liberty, then it subverts its own legitimacy, since protecting persons
and property is a primary justification for government. 63 The Court in Boyd further
elaborated the point with regard to Lord Camden's opinion in Entick, explaining:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security..... [T]hey apply to all invasions on
the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty, and private property ... .64
A government that invades the home crosses a boundary from the profane to the
sacred. As an institution the home has a status on a higher level than ordinary
property or social arrangements. This ordering between the sacred and profane is
further reflected in the Court's repeated assertions concerning "the overriding respect
for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins
of the Republic." 65 In this way, protecting the institution of the home is not only a
constitutional purpose but is also a constitutive feature of the constitutional order
"embedded in our traditions."66
The home's status within constitutional structure is further evident in how the
Court recognizes "the ancient adage that a man's house is his castle" and that "[t]he
poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown." 6 7 The
Court similarly reasoned regarding the Fourth Amendment that "[a]t the very core
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion." 68 Even when executive officials claimed that
national security necessity could justify warrantless domestic surveillance, the Court
recognized the special protections for the home, holding inviolate the warrant

63. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (1651); JOHN
LOcKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1689). See generally
JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL

IMAGINATION 9 (2010) ("Property promised to be . .

the perfect reconciliation of individual

freedom and social order, a legal institution, defined and enforced by the state, in which
spontaneous order could freely proceed and perpetually reinvent itself.").
64. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
65. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980).
66. Id.
67. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (citation omitted). Although
sometimes attributed to English common law, the Fourth Amendment expands the scope of
this right. William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man 's House Was Not His Castle: Origins
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 400

(1980) ("The Fourth Amendment represented an American extension of the English tradition
that a man's house was his castle.").
68. Silvermanv. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
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requirement against domestic intrusions.6 9 There are other places that are special too,
but only the home organizes both personal and social worlds in a way that creates
and preserves a separable sphere of governing power. The implication from this
special constitutional status the Court protects is that the home is the preserve of "the
People," who have a political function within constitutional structure, not only to
check government power through their rights-based limitations but also to legitimate
the political structure the Constitution creates. The Fourth Amendment's functional
core is to preserve this constitutional role.
Although the Court explained how "the Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at
the entrance to the house,"' which is also a "bright" line,70 household protections do
not end when one crosses the threshold. Such protections for intimate household
activities extend to what the Court calls "curtilage." 7 1 This area includes places
around the home "intimately linked to the home, both physically and
psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened." 72 Where there is
a social practice and a physical link to the home, household privacy extends outside
the strict structural confines enclosed by walls and doors. For example, in Jardines,
the Court made clear that a front porch "is the classic exemplar of an area adjacent
to the home and 'to which the activity of home life extends."' 73 Through the concept
of curtilage, the Court recognizes that the Fourth Amendment protects household
activities, not merely enclosed physical spaces. The household functions as a social
and political institution through activities that extend beyond its physical structure.
A. Beyond the Home's Threshold
But this extension of household activities beyond the home's threshold rapidly
comes into conflict with the Court's public observation doctrine whereby police are
not required to avert their eyes, as the Court explained, from activity readily apparent.
The "open fields" doctrine distinguishes curtilage from other household property
located at further remove from where personal activities can be seen by any passerby,
including government officials. 74 Once household activities become observable by
the public, they shed their distinctive sanctity and partake of the profane. They
become undifferentiated from other public activities through which we all become
vulnerable to the gaze of other persons. "[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for
those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government
interference or surveillance."7 5 Such logic now turns on the accessibility of the
household activity to a public vantage point. As the Court emphasized, at common

69. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("[P]hysical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed.");

see also THOMAS P. CROCKER, OVERCOMING NECESSITY: EMERGENCY,
CONSTRAINT, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 87-122 (2020).

70. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quotingPayton, 445 U.S. at 590).
71. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
72. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
73. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7 (2013) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 182 (1984)).
74. See id. at 6-7.
75. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
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law "open fields" constituted private property open to view by anyone, and the
converse, what is open to view from a public vantage point-even if that vantage
requires a plane or helicopter-is no longer private and thereby unprotected by the
Fourth Amendment. 76
Creating a separate doctrine for activities and objects publicly accessible and
thereby "knowingly exposed" to the public, the Court makes a distinction not only
in the scope of Fourth Amendment coverage but in its conception about what it
protects. If something is "knowingly exposed," the Court reasons that no search
occurs when government officials access what is exposed. 7 An analysis of
accessibility displaces consideration of the institutional or personal status of the place
or thing. No matter how personal the contents of one's garbage, for example, and no
matter how much waste reveals about intimate household activities otherwise
protected within the confines of four walls, accessibility to others alters its status. 78
Exposure supplants household protections. Such logic expands the toolkit of
unregulated activities, which police investigations may pursue. But it does so only
by building doctrines shorn from their underlying rationales. Under this logic, an
expectation of privacy is defeated by its knowing exposure, with little need to
examine the social and political implications of expanding the investigatory power
and reach of government officials. Nor is there any serious attempt-as the dissent
in the garbage case, California v. Greenwood, urges-to examine social practices
and their connections to the reach of government power. 79 In foregoing consideration
of such broader issues of government overreach in relation to household privacy, the
Court shifts its doctrinal focus toward facilitating policing practices, in part to avoid
the costs of inhibiting them. 80 A cluster of law-and-order considerations assist this
shift, including the rise of order-maintenance policing, which needs greater
constitutional flexibility to facilitate a more visible and proactive policing presence
within communities. 81 Exposure and public accessibility become the principal
analytic concepts that enable expanded police practices.

76. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (no search when plane observed residential backyard
activities); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (no search when helicopter hovered over a
home's backyard and greenhouse).
77. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection."); Riley, 488 U.S. at 449 ("As a general proposition, the police may see what may
be seen 'from a public vantage point where [they have] a right to be."' (quoting Ciraolo, 476
U.S. at 213)); see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
78. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) ("[W]e conclude that
respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth
Amendment protection.").
79. Id. at 51-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) ("[P]olice conduct must
be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable
that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.").
81. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar.
1982, at 29-30. For critical commentary, see Thomas P. Crocker, Order, Technology, and the
Constitutional Meanings of CriminalProcedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 685, 693702, 711-14 (2013); BERNARD HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001).
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Similarly, an object withheld from public view in the home becomes fully
trackable once placed in a vehicle. 82 "Public exposure" on streets, where any
passerby can observe one's activities, means that police officers, too, may observe
and track a person's movements. 83 When one leaves a home to drive a car, a person's
Fourth Amendment status changes from being an inviolate king or queen of a castle
to becoming an acceptable object of government surveillance. Because any person
who chooses to take note can observe an individual's movements, thereby making
them public, not private, matters, Fourth Amendment protections no longer attach.
As the Court admonishes, the police are not required to avert their eyes from readily
observable phenomenon, such as an individual's public movements on sidewalks and
streets. Constitutional protections do reattach if public tracking occurs by physical
placement of a GPS device on the car, or if tracking occurs later through historical
analysis of one's cell phone GPS coordinates.
In the cases confronting these two police practices, the quantity of data available
to law enforcement crosses a qualitative line, rendering too much information too
easily accessible without constitutional protection.84 It is one thing for law
enforcement to follow a car or to walk behind a suspect on a city street in a timelimited manner. It is an entirely different matter to obtain nearly effortlessly the
comprehensive data for a car's movements over an extended period of time through
GPS location tracking. In United States v. Jones, the Court rejected a government
claim that technologically enhanced surveillance of a car's public movements did not
constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 85 Citing prior precedents,
the government argued that GPS tracking was nothing different from the electronictracking "beeper" technology at stake in United States v. Karo, which fell under the
public observation doctrine.8 6 A majority of the Court reasoned that the physical
occupation wrought by placement of the GPS device on the automobile violated a
fundamental constitutional protection against physical trespass, quite apart from any
expectations of privacy that might be involved.8 7 Justice Scalia's majority opinion is
rooted in the history Lord Camden's opinion in Entick represents, citing favorably
the idea that "[o]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can
set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave ... ."88 Entick is not about
just any sacred property but is particularly about the home, protecting it as a realm
apart from the profane world of executive officials who would seek to trammel upon
personal privacies. As Justice Sotomayor explained when concurring in United
States v. Jones, "GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,

82. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) ("Indiscriminate monitoring of
property that has been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to
privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.").
83. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983).
84.

See David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98

MINN.

L.

REv. 62 (2013).
85. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
86. Id. at 409-10 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
87. Id. at 404.
88. Id. at 405 (quoting Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807; 19 Howell's State
Trials 1029 (C. P.)).
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political, professional, religious, and sexual associations." 89 Because rote reliance on
public exposure or the third-party doctrine renders such information readily
accessible to government inquiry, constitutional protections are therefore necessary
"to curb arbitrary exercises of police power and prevent 'a too permeating police
surveillance."' 90
When considering whether police may obtain the historical location data from a
person's cellphone-which in effect operates like a personal tracking device since it
constantly conveys location information to a cell phone service provider-the Court
backed away from a mechanical application of its third-party and public-observation
doctrines in Carpenter v. United States.91 Each of these doctrines, if thoughtlessly
applied, would suggest that the data obtained merely charts a person's public
movements at lower cost than physical surveillance. After all, as the dissent in
Carpenter notes, individuals readily share their movements with any observer who
cares to pay attention, and share their location data with a commercial entity who is
free to pass that information along to law enforcement. Despite the surface simplicity
of these doctrines, a majority of the Court recognized that the net effect of accessing
cell phone location data "achieves near perfect surveillance." 9 2 The quantity of
information available about a person's past movements is qualitatively different than
any other source of information previously available, and vastly outstrips the kind of
information available in prior third-party cases, which involved more discrete
information, such as the telephone numbers a person dials. 93 Even more than a GPS
device attached to an automobile, a cell phone is in social practice effectively
attached to its user, with the consequence that "[a] cell phone faithfully follows its
owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor's offices,
political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales."94 Such
comprehensive tracking is unlike anything previously possible.
Moreover, such tracking flattens out the distinction between home and street,
making information about one's movements in each equally possible. But in doing
so, the home's constitutive role provides a reason to extend privacy protection to all
of the information obtained as a way to check government access "that implicates
basic Fourth Amendment concerns about arbitrary government power." 95 As an
institution, the home and the privacies it contains stands apart from the public power
of government-a separation of the people's power and the government's the Fourth
Amendment seeks to balance. That separation does not depend upon switching the
constitution on and off when crossing the home's threshold. In this way, treating the
home as a privacy paradigm is not about creating a threshold bright line or
demarcating place as such as significant, but of organizing priorities and separated
powers. Arbitrary government power, when exercised by the executive, is capable of
invading the prerogatives of Congress and the prerogatives of citizens organized by
their attachment to a household.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 416-17 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Id. at 2218; see also Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 307-09 (2015).
See Smithv. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).

94. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
95. Id. at 2222.
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Despite the existence of doctrines based on exposure and accessibility, the Court
avoided mechanical application of public observation and third-party doctrines,
focusing on the dangers inherent in expanded government surveillance power. 96 The
roots of this concern, however, are grounded in the privacy protections afforded to
the home, as the Jones opinion's use of Entick demonstrates. By appealing to
founding-era concerns, the Court links privacy protections to antecedent conditions
for republican self-government. No doubt, the People's ability to conduct their affairs
in public is essential to republican government, but so too is the ability to be free of
comprehensive monitoring of all their movements-both at home and in public. 97
Such power would level the distinction between the home and public in a way that
upsets the balance between the government and the governed, where the sovereign
power of the latter reigns supreme. As the CarpenterCourt warned regarding access
to historical cell-site data, "this tool risks Government encroachment of the sort the
Framers, 'after consulting the lessons of history,' drafted the Fourth Amendment to
prevent." 98 These lessons teach against the tyranny of unchecked government power
to invade not simply the privacies of household life but the separate institutional
sphere of the home.
This anti-tyranny reasoning, while central to the Fourth Amendment both at the
Amendment's drafting and in more recent opinions, does not always take priority.
As the next section explores, there is a risk that the home becomes a paradigm of
privacy disconnected from its foundational purpose.
B. Avoiding the Privacy Prison
As a foundational premise, no one doubts that the Fourth Amendment provides
baseline protections for home and person. But why? What do these protections
achieve? The argument here is that Supreme Court opinions-and their
foundations-provide grounds for seeing the importance of the home as more than a
place of privacy but also as a separate institution with a distinctive role to play within
constitutional structure. But without broader theoretical guidance concerning the
Fourth Amendment's central values, there is a risk that episodic doctrinal decisions
fail to consider the implications for constitutional structure that protection of the
home provides. In this way, tension exists between claims that surveillance
techniques might provide too much data and the Court's treatment of intimacy in the
home. Even though some technologies produce too much data, the Court has not
jettisoned its analytic reliance upon accessibility and exposure. A tension exists
between intimacy and institution as two related, but potentially inconsistent, analytic
foci of the Fourth Amendment.

96. Id. at 2223 (declining to extend the third-party doctrine because of "the deeply
revealing nature of CSLI [(cell-site location information)], its depth, breadth, and
comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection"); see Stephen
E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the FourthAmendment ThirdPartyDoctrine,

14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431 (2013).
97. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 762 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances.").
98. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595
(1948)).
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By emphasizing the implications of exposure and accessibility to places and
things, the Court's reasoning risks treating the home as the sum of intimate activities
withheld from public exposure. In Kyllo v. United States, a case examining whether
police can use a thermal imaging device to obtain information about the relative heat
escaping from the home, the Court emphasized how the Fourth Amendment protects
the privacies of the home against the claimed needs of police. 99 This technology
allowed police to obtain information readily accessible "off the wall" of the home's
exterior from which they could use to make inferences about the activities inside.
Such information, the Court reasoned, is about the most intimate activities of the
home, such as "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna
and bath." 0 0 Seeming to utilize "separate spheres" logic, whereby femininity is
associated with household intimacy, and by implication masculinity is about public
affairs, the Court does not explain why such intimacies must be protected. They are
withheld from view, no doubt. "In the home, our cases show all details are intimate
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes." 01 But
why protect all "intimate details"? What purpose do such intimate details play in
individual lives, and what harm occurs from "prying government eyes"? In Kyllo,
the Court made an inside-outside distinction that reiterated the Fourth Amendment's
bright line protections for the home without connecting the distinction to a governing
purpose evident in other considerations of the home. Intimacy disconnected from
institution risks making all interactions that occur outside the home less or
unprotected. 1 2
If shorn of any other consideration about content, social role, or attachment to the
home, then analysis of Fourth Amendment household protections can lead to the kind
of distortions against which scholars, such as Professor Sklansky, warn. Namely,
making the home the paradigm of privacy implies that stepping outside the home
inevitably leads to a loss of privacy. 0 3 By focusing on an analysis of accessibility
and exposure, one implication is that privacy becomes more like secrecy. Indeed, the
Supreme Court's "third-party doctrine" follows this implication. If individuals wish
to have constitutional protections, then they must not share their homes, activities, or
information with others. By sharing an internal space with another person who might
incidentally be a government agent, one "assumes the risk," the Court explains, that
one's activities and information are no longer protected. A person's assumed risk
spreads to follow her every transaction with others, whether through banks,
communications providers, or social media, to name only a few. 104 Under the Court's

99. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
100. Id. at 38.
101. Id. at 37.
102. Stern, supra note 4; see also Kyllo, 553 U.S. at 40; Linda C. McClain, Inviolability
and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195 (1995).

103. Sklansky, supra note 16 ("If privacy receives more protection in the home than
elsewhere, it necessarily follows that leaving one's home means losing some privacy-that
the price of full privacy is not going out.").
104. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) ("But when . . the home
is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting
unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if carried on [in
public]."); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (regardingbank records,
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rationale, because a person knowingly shares information with these third parties,
and because those with whom one shares are free to further share this information
with government officials, one assumes the risk associated with losing Fourth
Amendment protections by these acts of sharing. Sharing makes information and
activities accessible to others. By sharing, one exposes oneself. In this way, the home
as privacy paradigm becomes its own privacy prison, for to cross the threshold or to
share one's space, one sheds key Fourth Amendment protections.
One need not even cross the threshold, however, in order to assume the risk of
police intrusion into the home. One need only invite others inside to share occupancy
of a home, thereby assuming a risk that co-occupants will yield to police inquiries,
and thus allow unwarranted searches of co-habitational spaces. 15 Given the potential
complexity of household sharing, this risk can spread to any person whom police
have a good-faith belief shares authority over the space they wish to search. 106 And
depending on the overall purpose and duration of social guests' visit, they may not
receive the protective shield the household provides, making the threshold bright

only for some occupants.

107

Physical presence at the threshold can also be a necessary factor to make the
Fourth Amendment's protections bright for a shared occupancy. The Court held in
Georgia v. Randolph that at the threshold of a home, an objecting co-occupant's
refusal of consent renders unreasonable any attempt by the police to effectuate
another co-occupant's consent.108 In Randolph, a spousal dispute led to one marital
partner offering the police consent to search when the other partner denied it. In this
situation, the Court concluded that it would be unreasonable for police to enter, in
part because background social norms would make it unlikely that any person would
believe they were welcome to enter. 109 Chief Justice Roberts argued in dissent that
the assumption of risk that accompanies shared household occupancy means that an
individual who shares a household is vulnerable to the consent cohabitants might

a person "takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by that person to the Government"); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)
("[N]o legitimate expectation of privacy ... when [a person] . . . voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information . . . [and
thereby] assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.");
Palmieri v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 3d 191, 210 (D.D.C. 2014) ("[W]hen a Facebook user
allows 'friends' to view his information, the Government may access that information through
an individual who is a 'friend' without violating the Fourth Amendment."); Sklansky, supra
note 36, at 1085 (noting how much privacy is challenged because "more and more of our lives
are carried out online . . [where] [n]o sensors are required to spy on this conduct: by its very
nature, it leaves a digital record, typically one with multiple copies.").
105. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) ("[I]t is reasonable to
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right
and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common
area to be searched.").
106. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
107. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998) (holding that a temporary visitor
engaged in a commercial transaction has no expectation of privacy within the host home).
108. 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006).

109. Id. at 113-14.
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grant police.11 In a subsequent case, Fernandez v. California, police removed the
non-consenting household occupant from the home only to return to the scene to act
on the consenting occupant's permission." In a majority opinion written by Chief
Justice Roberts, the Court held that such action was reasonable. Having crossed the
threshold, the non-consenting citizen's privacy protections no longer applied against
a cohabitant's waiver. Because physical "presence of the objecting occupant"1 1 2 is
necessary, the Court reasoned, "the consent of one who possesses common authority
over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with
whom that authority is shared." 11 3
Households are complex living arrangements in which the ability to host invitees
extends the social and political organization of society. The precise constitution of
the household is highly variable as well. Households can consist of a small nuclear
family, but may also include extended family members, non-family members, or be
organized in entirely other ways. 1 4 No matter the composition, a household provides
both formal and informal order for intimate and social relations." 5 Nonetheless, in
this distinctive role, the Court reasons that members of a household are made
vulnerable to the risks that guests present. They might wear a wire, be informants, or
otherwise diminish privacy protections within the home. 1 6 Guests, too, bear risks,
for those present in a home with insufficient temporal or intimate attachments may
not receive privacy protections from government intrusion into the host's home.
Because "[s]taying overnight in another's home is a longstanding social custom that
serves functions recognized as valuable by society," the Court recognized that we all
share expectations of privacy in a host's home.1 17 But when a household occupant
entertains a social visitor "who is merely present with the consent of the
householder," the visitor may not claim Fourth Amendment protections.118 In this
way, the Court's treatment of the home as a sacred site "at the core of the Fourth
Amendment" 119 proves highly malleable in light of the profane needs of law
enforcement. Given the implications of the third-party doctrine and the assumption
of risks that sharing one's home creates, keeping to oneself and minimizing social
interaction by implication seem to be the only ways to preserve the constitutional

110. Id. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("If an individual shares information, papers, or
places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share access to that
information or those papers or places with the government." (emphasis in original)).
111. 571 U.S. 292, 294 (2014).
112. Id. at 302.
113. Id. at 299-300 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974)).
114. See ROBERT C. ELLLCKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH
(2008).

115. Id. at 1.
116. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971).
117. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).
118. Minnesotav. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). Concurring in Carter, Justice Scalia cites
to a 1604 English case for the idea that a visitor does not receive protection in another's
"castle," for "the house of any one is not a castle or privilege but for himself, and shall not
extend to protect any person who flies to his house." Id. at 94 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
Semayne's Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 198 (K.B.)).
119. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999).
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sanctity of the home. This can have the consequence of making the home a privacy
prison.
If exercising freedom with others in fulfilling the home's organizational role in
social life undermines privacy, then privacy's purpose is thwarted even upon the
domain in which it is meant to be inviolable. When added to the scholarly criticism
that household exceptionalism leads to a loss of privacy elsewhere, these doctrines
imply that constitutionally protected privacy exists only for those who keep to
themselves. But keeping to oneself is inconsistent with the constitutional role the
household plays in organizing social and political life-forms of life that are
unavoidably shared with others. In the context of the workplace, Justice Scalia
recognized this problem, reasoning that
[i]t is privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment, not solitude.
A man enjoys Fourth Amendment protection in his home, for example,
though his wife and children have the run of the place-and indeed,
even though his landlord has the right to conduct unannounced
inspections at any time. Similarly, in my view, one's personal office is
constitutionally protected against warrantless intrusions by the police,
even though employer and co-workers are not excluded.12
By extending household privacy into other shared domains, Justice Scalia provided
a reason for thinking that the home need not be the paradigm of privacy as secrecy,
even if in Kyllo his focus on intimate details implied otherwise.
Importantly, these assumption of risk doctrines implicate the role of the home
without reconciling their effects upon the home. Moreover, these doctrines do not
always point in the same direction. Intimacy is a central building block for household
privacy. But intimacy is a form of sharing among two or more persons. If sharing
were to inexorably lead to a loss of constitutionally protected privacy, the home
would become a constitutional paradox. As a paradigm of privacy, the home would
also be a paradigm of diminished privacy. But if intimacy risks a loss of
constitutional rights, then government intrusion risks undermining constitutional
structure. Because the home is an institutional foundation for ordering social and
political life, "assumption of risk" reasoning itself erodes an important feature of
constitutional structure. Because law enforcement may seek to exploit a person's
intimate connections, judicial doctrine risks creating an intimacy trap. Intimacy is an
important feature of human and social life, but it is also a source of vulnerability to
state power. The way out of the paradox is to appeal to the constitutional purposes
of protecting the home for both its intimate and institutional roles.
The Fourth Amendment protects the home not merely because intimate details are
private, but because their privacy is a necessary condition for the possibility of public
life. Persons need the organization and protection a household provides, whether
living alone or in the company of others. In this way, household intimacy is
inseparable from the home's institutional role. 2 If, as Justice Kennedy warned in

120. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 730 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
121. For example, the Court recognized the fundamental importance of a household's
familial constitution under the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, concluding that
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Lawrence v. Texas, government could become a dominant presence in the home,1 22
it is difficult to see how this not only impacts individual liberty but the institutional
role the home plays in organizing everyday collective life-a necessary condition for
self-government, which, as we will see in Part III below, is a purpose that converges
with First Amendment and due process protections. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence
in Jones recognizes this connection between pervasive government surveillance,
intimacy, and democracy when it comes to GPS surveillance by police: "[B]y making
available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information
about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to
track-may 'alter the relationship 3between citizen and government in a way that is
12
inimical to democratic society."'
If all details of the home are intimate details, and if government access to intimate
details requires heightened constitutional protections, then despite the vulnerabilities
shared access creates under Supreme Court doctrine, the home's institutional role in
sheltering these details can provide a basis for extending privacy protections. This
possibility is realized when technology extends the possession of personal
information-intimate details-on devices that can be carried into public. When this
happens, a conflict between public accessibility and intimate details arises, as the
next section examines. When this conflict arises, if we see the home's institutional
role extends beyond protecting "intimate details" merely in virtue of their
inaccessibility to the public, then the home can serve as a model for extending
privacy in public. If the Constitution protects intimate details as a way of preserving
a separate zone of governing power-the ability of the people to play their role as in
participatory self-determining democracy-then, contrary to the objection that the
home as a privacy paradigm is paradoxically harmful for privacy, the home becomes
a way of extending privacy protections in public in virtue of preserving this separate
institutional role.
II. AT HOME IN PUBLIC: ON BALANCING AND WHAT TO CONSIDER
The Fourth Amendment's privacy protections are subject to an inquiry whereby
"the Court must balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns
to determine if the intrusion here was reasonable." 1 24 Even in the home, under a
doctrine that authorizes search incident to arrest, the Court balances privacy interests
against the particular needs of the police.125 Once police assert a claimed need to
access a person or place, judicial reliance on reasonableness as the Fourth
Amendment's "touchstone" leads inexorably to questions about whether and when
privacy protections may be invaded to accommodate police needs. This privacy
versus police dichotomy is deeply entrenched in both judicial and scholarly

"the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
122. 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
123. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
124. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 326 (2001).
125. See Chimelv. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
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thinking. 12 6 At the same time, however, judicial reasoning regarding the home also
contains an alternate way of imagining the reach of privacy protections to new
technologies even in public spaces. This section explores this alternate constitutional
imaginary.12 7
A. Technology and Household Privacy in Public
In Riley v. California, the Court explained that
[a]bsent more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally
determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant
requirement "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it
intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests."128
When Riley was arrested, he possessed a smartphone. 129 Under the search incident
to arrest doctrine, police are entitled to search persons subject to arrest, including
bags and other containers found in their possession.13 0 The question Riley presented
was whether police are entitled to search the contents of a person's smartphone as if
it were no different than searching any other personal possession.13 1 Arguing that the
doctrine should mechanically apply, California asserted that there was no relevant
difference between the crumpled cigarette pack at issue in UnitedStates v. Robinson
and the contents of a cell phone.13 2 And because the search incident doctrine was
established by balancing the relevant interests of the person to be free from physical
intrusion and the police needs for safety and evidence, the government argued that
no further interests needed to be balanced.133 In response, the Court acknowledged
that balancing of interests supports the search incident to arrest doctrine established
by Robinson, but that further mechanical application of the doctrine focused on
examination of physical objects would not strike the right balance when it comes to
the digital content found on cell phones.13 4 Balancing done in the case of physical

126. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-AdjustmentTheory of the FourthAmendment,
125 HARv. L. REv. 476 (2011).
127. See CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIEs 24 (2004) ("[A] social

imaginary . . incorporates a sense of the normal expectations we have of each other, the kind
of common understanding that enables us to carry out the collective practices that make up
our social life. This incorporates some sense of how we all fit together in carrying out the
common practice.").
128. 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
129. Riley, 573 U.S. at 379.
130. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding police may search the
contents of a crumpled cigarette package).
131. Riley, 573 U.S. at 378.
132. Id. at 386.

133. Id. at 386-91.
134. Id. at 393 (rejecting the claim that searching incident to arrest a cigarette pack is no
different than a smartphone, "[t]hat is like saying a ride on horseback is materially
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searches of a person can legitimate a categorical search incident to arrest rule, but
cannot justify a similar result when it comes to digital content on a cell phone. 135
Because a cell phone contains "vast quantities of personal information," the balance
of privacy looks very different than in the context of physical objects. Indeed,
"[m]odern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those
implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse." 136 The physical
equivalent of the digital data a "smart" phone contains would include lugging around
"every piece of mail they have received ... every picture they have taken, or every
book or article they have read." 13 7
This vast quantity of data also has a qualitative dimension, for it can expose a far
greater amount of information about a person's life, including historical location data
and internet search histories that extends beyond physical analogues. 138 Pervasive
social practices integrate this information into daily activities, including use of
platforms that share selected information with others. 13 9 As the Court observed, "it
is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American adults who
own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their
lives-from the mundane to the intimate." 14 Using smartphones integrates other
social practices in new ways, whether through maintaining connections, collating
memories, tracking steps taken, or any number of other activities. Such technological
integration of information with daily activities would make available not only a vast
quantity of information to a searching police officer, but also could quickly paint a
narrative picture of a person's life. Given the nature of this information and the
pervasive social practices that integrate use of smartphone technology, the Court
further distinguished physical searches in a way that forestalled mechanical
application of the search incident to arrest doctrine to new technological
circumstances.14 1 There is no social practice in which Americans carry around that
much stuff-file cabinets full of paper, libraries of books, overflowing photo albums,
call records and address books, for example-that could be available to a search
incident to arrest, for "[i]n Riley's case . . . it is implausible that he would have
strolled around with video tapes, photo albums, and an address book all crammed
into his pockets." 14 2 Access to all of this content would constitute "a significant

indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B,
but little else justifies lumping them together.").
135. Id. at 386 ("A search of the information on a cell phone bears little resemblance to the
type of brief physical search considered in Robinson.").
136. Id. at 386, 393.
137. Id. at 393-94.
138. See Gray & Citron, supra note 84, at 73.
139.

See Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other FourthAmendment

Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REv. 614 (2011); see also FRANK PASQUALE,
THE BLACK BOx
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19-58 (2015).
140. Riley, 573 U.S. at 395.
141. Id. at 397-98.
142. Id. at 400.
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diminution of privacy."143 Access to this content would also be equivalent to
searching the confines of a home.
In a pre-digital world, a person might carry around a single bank transaction
receipt, a few wallet photos, and the like, which are samples of the kinds of records
often kept at home. But a doctrine that justifies searching the very limited quantities
of such physical material a person might carry, the Court reasoned, does not justify
searching much greater quantities of household material simply because it can now
be transported in digital form.14 4 Smartphone technology makes voluminous
quantities of household material portable. But that fact does not suddenly turn
household privacy into public exposure. Government officials argued that because
under Robinson they could search physical examples of such material, they therefore
could access the digital equivalent of all such household contents. 14 5 For the
government, household privacy no longer applied because such contents were now
accessible in public. 146 In rejecting this argument, the Riley Court reasoned in the
opposite direction. Household privacy extends into public. 147
If public exposure could make so much information accessible to law enforcement
inspection through a search incident to arrest doctrine, then we would expect an
increase in arrests for minor offenses. InAtwater v. City ofLago Vista, the Court held
that arrests for minor offenses did not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when the
penalty for conviction entailed only a fine. 148 Even though the Court acknowledged
the "gratuitous humiliations" 14 9 that such arrests may impose, the Court nonetheless
refused to limit police behavior. Ms. Atwater had been arrested in her neighborhood
in front of her children for a seatbelt violation that carried no more than a nominal
fine." Despite recognizing the "pointless indignity" she suffered, the Court
reasoned that it must "strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance" that "credit[s]
1
the government's side with an essential interest in readily administrable rules." 15
Were the Court to extend search incident to arrest to cover smartphones, such
"readily administrable rules" would provide a powerful incentive for law
enforcement to use its arrest power over minor offenses to gain access to the effective
contents of a person's home. When prioritizing police need, doctrines can in this way
work together to diminish the separation of powers between law enforcement and the
home institution.
Acknowledging the Court's typical role in providing police with "workable rules"
15
under the Fourth Amendment,2
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Riley did not

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 393-97.
Id. at 392-93.
Id.
Id. at 396-97.
532 U.S. 318, 318 (2001).
Id. at 346.
Id. at 323-24.

151. Id. at 347; see Josh Bowers, ProbableCause, ConstitutionalReasonableness, and the

Unrecognized Point of a "PointlessIndignity," 66 STAN. L. REv. 987, 1002 (2014) ("[T]he
Atwater Court refused even to ask whether an objectively reasonable officer would have acted
likewise.").
152. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 398 (2014).
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prioritize the needs of police. As a result, police work will cost a bit more. But,
"[p]rivacy comes at a cost,""s the Court admonished. In conducting this balancing,
the Court analyzed two interests: individual privacy against law enforcement need. "4
Absent from the analysis is any explanation for the structural role such balancing
fulfills. It is as if the balance floats free of the constitutional structure from which it
arises. The self-evident nature of the terms of balance-the privacy to be protected
and the invasions the police require-lack any reference to an overriding value or
goal by which to judge the propriety of any given balance. Instead, the balance is a
tug-of-war between police and privacy in which the Court often sees its role as
providing police with "workable rules"" 5 that do not unduly hamper legitimate law
enforcement interests. The explanandum-the scope of the Fourth Amendment-is
thus analyzed in terms of a balance that is itself unmoored from any broader
constitutional connection.
If a person is in public, why worry about the private content she carries on her
person? To answer that question, the Court avers to the incidents of household
privacy people transport into public, providing a key takeaway from Riley.156 But if
in public, why should incidents of household privacy matter? To conclude that
extension of the search incident doctrine to smartphone contents would be an
invasion of privacy revealing a large quantity of data does not yet explain why
exposure of this information in this setting matters, especially since no physical
invasion of the home is required. No doubt, such a search can reveal lots of private
information, but so too does searching a bag or purse a person happens to tote.
Linking the quantity of data to the home provides a threshold explanation but needs
to be supplemented by a missing inquiry into why the home matters, especially when
paradoxically household privacies are found in public. Balancing privacy with police
need in order to protect privacy is an analytic circle that leaves unexplained why
privacy matters and must be subject to balance.
One explanation that makes sense of both Riley and the special status the Court
grants the home is that by extending the privacy protections afforded the home to
searches conducted in public, the structural goal of the Fourth Amendment grounds
the privacy-police balance. This goal provides a check on discretionary executive
power in order to avoid the arbitrary rule of officials over a coordinate political
institution-the home. Through protecting privacy, the Court limits discretionary
executive action and promotes the vertical separation of powers, which in the context
of federalism, as the Court explained, protects liberty.157 The home is a separate
sphere in which the people possess power in their privacy. It functions as a horizontal
institution by analogy to other federal powers, thereby retaining its own structural
role and privileges under the Constitution. As the principal place providing order to
the privacies of life, the home functions both as an institutional repository for the
people's political and social organization and as an institutional limit on executive
power. The home is also a paradigm for privacy protection providing a basis for

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 401.
Id. at 385-86.
Id. at 398.
See id. at 396-97.
See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-59 (1991).
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limiting the expository power of the state to exploit superior access to information
under a claim that it has been publicly exposed.158
Riley does not explain this institutional role, but the Court does place protection
of the home at the center of its reasons for protecting smartphones from unwarranted
searches.15 9 Indeed, the Court cites to Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second
Circuit in 1926, to argue that it is "a totally different thing to search a man's pockets
and use against him what they contain, from ransacking his house for everything
which may incriminate him." 160 Such reasoning not only spans the relation between
a person and a house as two "sites" of government intrusion but also marks a
difference in degree that gives rise to a difference in kind. A little bit of evidence
found on the person is nothing like either the amount or kind of information that can
be found by searching a house. But this difference collapses, the Court observes, if
the pocket contains a smartphone, for
a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far
more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only
contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in
the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never
found in a home in any form .... 161
In one device, government officials can unlock household secrets as well as a
vast amount of information about one's relationships and movements, all connected
to household intimacies and privacies, but now compiled in one handy source. In this
way, the relation between person and home-pockets and rooms-forms a
conceptual unity. This is a unity Justice Brandeis presciently-and more than a little
eerily-foresaw in his 1928 dissent in Olmstead v. United States: "Ways may some
day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home."1 6 2 Unfettered access to a
smartphone would constitute such a way to remotely unlock household secrets.
The home's institutional role within constitutional structure helps explain Chief
Justice Roberts's Riley opinion. Riley makes an important case for household privacy
as a limit on executive authority, even when in public and even though armed with a

158. As the Court reasoned: "For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely
entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler
who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim
an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive
with the locked attache case." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (citations
omitted).
159. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 393-94, 397 ("Most people cannot lug around every piece of
mail they have received for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every
book or article they have read-nor would they have any reason to attempt to do so. And if
they did, they would have to drag behind them a trunk .... ").
160. Id. at 396 (quoting United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926)).
161. Id. at 396-97 (emphasis in original).
162. 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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judicial doctrine that permits physical intrusions of the person incident to arrest.i13
Avoiding arbitrary government discretion to intrude upon household privacies, even
for a person in public, serves the purpose of maintaining separation of powers
between the people upon whose liberty and consent government legitimacy rests and
the government actors through whom the people maintain ordered liberty. 164 As the
following sections will also explore, the multifaceted protections the home receives
under the Constitution bolster the conclusion that the home has institutional standing
within the American constitutional system. But this conclusion is in tension with the
availability of necessity exceptions, even in the home. In the balance of interests, if
the government need is sufficiently pressing in terms of time or harm, the Fourth
Amendment makes available exigency exceptions, even in the home. The availability
of such claims to necessity risks undermining the coherence of the view this Article
takes. For if the home plays a structural role, then intruding upon it on a claim of
episodic exigency should provide insufficient reasons for risking harms to its
institutional life. In order to make the case for the home's constitutional role,
exigency should be contained the way the aggrandizement of a coordinate branch of
government might be. 165
B. Exigency Exceptions
Commitment to constitutional rule is always bounded by the availability of exits.
Americans pre-commit to govern within certain constitutional limits but remain open
to practical deviations so that not only the Constitution can be "adapted to the various
crises of human affairs" 166 but also existing rules can be applied flexibly in light of
the emerging situations law enforcement may face. 167 Rights limitations are often
subject to balancing tests that weigh the degree of necessity imposed by a
government interest against the constitutional value that would limit government
choice of action. 168 Exigency doctrines within the Fourth Amendment instantiate this
dynamic, freeing law enforcement from the straightjacket of normal legal rules when
extraordinary situations arise. In this way, the more Fourth Amendment protections
for the home are viewed as solely rights based, the more salient exigency exceptions
will seem. And in contraposition, the more salient the institutional role the home
plays within constitutional structure, the less attractive such exigency exceptions will
become.

163. See also Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment
FrameworkforAnalyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527 (2017).
164.

See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, SeparatedPowers and OrderedLiberty, 139 U. PA. L.

REV. 1513, 1514 (1991) (examining the "link between constitutional strmcture and liberty").
165. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
166. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis in original).
On pre-commitments, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 115-46 (2000).
167. See THOMAS P. CROCKER, OVERCOMING NECESSITY: EMERGENCY, CONSTRAINT, AND
THE MEANINGS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 87-122 (2020).
168. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture and the State of
Constitutional Culture, 61 SMU L. REV. 221 (2008); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial
Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (2007).
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In establishing the modern exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment, the
Court was tasked with setting limits on access to a home. In Mincey v. Arizona, the
Court confronted an emergency situation involving the homicide of a police officer
in a home, which clearly justified immediate entry, control of the crime scene, and
preliminary investigation. 169 But police relied on the temporally bounded emergency
to occupy the home for investigatory purposes for an extended time that exceeded
17
"the exigencies of the situation" without gaining the requisite judicial warrant.?
Even though there was no doubt that probable cause would have existed to obtain the
needed warrant, the Court reasoned that "the privacy of a person's home and property
may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of
the criminal law."1 7 1 When "the exigencies of the situation" are so compelling, law
enforcement can forego the warrant requirement, bending constitutional constraints
to conform to law enforcement needs. 172 In this way, the Fourth Amendment
internalizes a structure of balance allowing the government to claim that deviation
from constitutional protections are necessary in light of the exigent circumstances.
A recent case considering police access to the home in exigent situations
highlights the principles and perils of the doctrine. In Kentucky v. King, the Court
considered whether Fourth Amendment constraints would allow police to enter a
home without knocking and without a warrant out of fear that evidence might be
imminently destroyed. 173 In writing the majority opinion, Justice Alito
acknowledged the traditional view regarding the home, quoting from a recent case
whose holding found reason to extend police authority into the interior of the home:
"It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law," we have often said, "that searches
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."1 7 4 By
using the expression, "we have often said," Justice Alito's opinion distances itself
from the proposition that the Fourth Amendment provides special protections for the
home, emphasizing instead the fact that "this presumption may be overcome in some
circumstances" because the "ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
'reasonableness.' 17 5 Although the home is said to have a special place in the life of
criminal procedure, the opinion notes that "the warrant requirement is subject to
certain reasonable exceptions." 1 7 6 These reasonable exceptions provide police
authority to enter a home without a warrant in order to render emergency aid,1 77 to

169. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
170. Id. at 394.
171. Id. at 393.
172. Id. at 394; see also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (fire); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) ("hot pursuit"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 770-71 (1966) (imminent destruction of evidence).
173. 563 U.S. 452 (2011).
174. Id. at 459 (citation omitted). The opinion also recognizes that "[i]n no quarter does
the Fourth Amendment apply with greater force than in our homes, our most private space
which, for centuries, has been regarded as 'entitled to special protection."' Id. at 474 (citation
omitted).
175. Id. at 459 (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403).
176. Id. (citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403).
177. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403.
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pursue a fleeing suspect, 178 and to prevent the pending destruction of evidence, 179
among other possible exceptions. It is the latter exception that matters in King.180
Justice Alito's opinion reasons that "[w]here, as here, the police did not create the
exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth
Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable
and thus allowed." 181 The underlying facts occur at the home's threshold. After a
controlled-narcotics buy went sideways, police officers lost sight of the suspect as he
entered a nearby apartment complex and then came to a door where they smelled
marijuana burning.18 2 Officers claimed that they banged loudly on the door, yelled
"[p]olice, police, police," "could hear people inside moving," and then kicked in the
door and entered the home. 8 3 Despite the nature of this home intrusion-where
police kick in a door and enter unceremoniously into the sacred confines of a homethe Court reasoned that "a rule that precludes the police from making a warrantless
entry to prevent the destruction of evidence whenever their conduct causes the
exigency would unreasonably shrink the reach of this well-established exception to
the warrant requirement."184 Under this logic, the exception becomes the rule, and
the home has no special role to play.185 Even though residents of a home are
purported to have the constitutional right not to answer the door, since lacking a
warrant law enforcement officers are like any other member of the public, Justice
Alito reasoned that the subjective fears of police justified the home invasion. 186
Glossing over what residents who wish to avoid the police encounter are supposed
to do to ensure that their ordinary household activities are not misconstrued as
attempts to destroy evidence, the Court admonishes: "Occupants who choose not to
stand on their constitutional rights but instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence
have only themselves to blame for the warrantless exigent-circumstances search that
may ensue." 18 7 Rather than the sacred precinct of ordinary household activity said to
be beyond the reach of government surveillance and intrusion, the home becomes an
accessible opportunity for police to create encounters with residents that might open
the door to further investigation.188 The Fourth Amendment basis for this intrusion
is reasonableness.

178. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976).
179. Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39-41 (1963).
180. King, 563 U.S. at 462.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 456.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 461-62.
185. See Crocker, supra note 81, at 717 (discussing how "the Court protects the exception
against 'unreasonable' applications of the rule").
186. King, 563 U.S. at 469-70 ("[W]hether the person who knocks on the door and requests
the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no obligation
to open the door or to speak.").
187. Id. at 470.
188. Indeed, creating such encounters is precisely the point of police "knock and talk"
procedures, the validity of which the Court here affirms. In a "knock and talk," police knock
on a door and use the open door as an occasion to peer into the household beyond in hopes of
seeing something illegal, thereby justifying an entry and seizure under the Court's "plain
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Emphasizing exigency's roots in a general "reasonableness" inquiry is of more
recent vintage, carving out a presence in two recent Roberts Court opinions189 from
the general proposition announced in Mincey that a warrant is required unless "the
exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable."1 90 One such exigency is to protect life
and avoid serious physical injury.191 In Brigham City v. Stuart,192 on which King
relies, 193 when officers arrive at a loud party, walk to the back of the house, observe
punches being thrown by two persons inside, the Court concluded that they act
reasonably in entering without a warrant to quell the violence and render assistance
to those injured.194 Likewise, in another case when police officers arrived at a home
to find disorder in the yard, drops of blood on the hood of a disheveled parked pickup,
and an occupant in the home "screaming and throwing things," 195 the Court
concluded that they acted reasonably when entering the home without a warrant. 196
In still another case, police entered a home without a warrant after initially
confronting a juvenile and his mother on their home's front steps. 197 Inquiring about
a social media post and the student's absence from school, the police, fearing possible
violence and believing the mother's behavior "odd," entered to investigate further. 198
Relying on exigent circumstances, the Court explained that "reasonableness 'must
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,' who is "often
forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving." 199
The factual circumstances of these and similar exigencies hinge on an
examination of the seriousness of the threat or the likelihood of serious injury that
might follow under a standard of reasonableness. This free-floating inquiry begins
with claims, like those in Brigham City, that an exigency exception to the warrant
requirement occurs with "the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or
threatened with such injury." 200 But, the Court retreated from imposing a rigorous
standard, claiming instead that "[t]he role of a peace officer includes preventing
violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties." 201 In this
manner, the peace officer serves an order-maintenance function that extends into the

view" doctrine. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (plain view); United States v.
Johnson, 170 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 1999) ("knock and talk").
189. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); King, 563 U.S. at 467.
190. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978).
191. Id. at 392 ("The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification
for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency." (quoting Wayne v.
United States 318 F.2d 205, 212 (1963))); see also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509
(1978) (holding warrantless entry to fight and investigate fire permitted).
192. 547 U.S. at 406-07.
193. King, 563 U.S. at 459.
194. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406-07.
195. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 46 (2009).
196. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406-07.
197. Rybumv. Huff, 565 U.S. 469 (2012).
198. Id. at 471.
199. Id. at 477 (quoting Grahamv. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)).
200. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403.
201. Id. at 406.

20201

THE FOURTHAMENDMENTA T HOME

199

disorderly interior of the home. 202 Even everyday, non-exigent facts can be colored
by police fear and "common sense" to conclude that "a combination of events each
of which is mundane when viewed in isolation may paint an alarming picture." 203
Although the painting's artistry depends on police perceptions, the Court uses
"reasonableness" to avoid a more exacting scrutiny of the effects on household
privacy. Indeed, the Court provides no separate analysis of the home's structural role
under the Fourth Amendment in light of law enforcement actions in these
"emergency assistance" cases.
Hovering just out of view of the particular circumstances of these cases are similar
facts with more pressing social meaning. Indeed, for all the rhetoric conferring
special status on it, the home can also be a source of violence and harmful disorder. 204
What if residents subject to domestic violence are in need, or other forms of danger
lurk within the confines of the home? 205 Observable disorder within the home might
indicate the possibility that other occupants might be endangered. 206 Such questions
inform the test the reviewing court should apply: "whether there was 'an objectively
reasonable basis for believing' that medical assistance was needed, or persons were
in danger." 207 An affirmative answer to this inquiry removes Fourth Amendment
restrictions from the threshold of the home. Moreover, because the Court does not
consider the seriousness of the crime under investigation as part of the
reasonableness inquiry, it does not matter why the police are at the door when the
circumstances become exigent. 20 1 What matters is the perceived presence of danger.
In this regard, the home is little different than the public street where peace officers
have unquestioned duties of "preventing violence and restoring order" 209 when
confronting disorderly or threatening persons.210 When police proffer consensual

202. See Wilson et al., supra note 81, at 29-30. But see HARCOURT, supra note 81.
203. Ryburn, 565 U.S. at 476-77.
204. See Aya Grmber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741 (2007); Reva B.
Siegel, "The Rule of Love ": Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy, 105

YALE

L.J. 2117,

2150-70 (1996); Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 504 (2009).
205. These considerations lurk in the background to Georgia v. Randolph, and they are
made explicit in Justice Breyer's separate concurrence. 547 U.S. 103, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).

206. Michiganv. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (upholding police officers' "need to ensure
that Fisher was not endangering someone else in the house").
207. Id. (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006)).
208. Id. at 47; see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 335-36 (2001). But see Welsh
v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (holding warrantless entry to preserve evidence of
minor offense does not fall within the exigent circumstance exception).
209. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406.
210. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, andDeterrence, 83 VA.

L. REV. 349, 369 (1997) ("Visible disorder is a self-reinforcing cue about the community's
attitude toward crime."); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in
the Inner City, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 805, 806 (1998) ("By shaping preferences for crime,
accentuating the perceived status of lawbreaking, and enfeebling the institutions that normally
hold criminal propensities in check, disorderly norms create crime."); see also Robert C.
Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers,Skid Rows, and

Public-SpaceZoning, 105

YALE

L.J.

1165, 1247-48 (1996) ("Judges should refrain from using
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conversation with citizens, Fourth Amendment rights depend on citizen responses
and police perceptions, even in the home. Indeed, one goal of the Court's opinion in
King is to facilitate consensual police encounters, even at the threshold of the home,
for a person "may appreciate the opportunity to make an informed decision about
whether to answer the door to the police."21 By bringing order-maintenance
considerations into the household interior, the distinction between street and home
erodes-a possibility only when inquiry into police "reasonableness" becomes
disconnected from consideration of privacy and its institutional role.
Order maintenance requires circumstantial flexibility guided by "reasonableness"
because the situations of disorder and danger are unforeseeable and variable.
Naturally, the police would like to search wherever they want and to seize whatever
they find, but the point of the Fourth Amendment is to guide and constrain zealous
law enforcement. The greater the zeal and the stronger the desire for police to utilize
particular investigatory techniques, the more the Fourth Amendment serves to
restrict unfettered police practice. Justice Jackson's opinion in Johnson v. United
States, which Kentucky v. King at least in part silently overrules, 2 articulates well
why warrants are required.
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.2 1 3
Against this idea, the point of recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement
when police fear evidence will be destroyed is to affirm the inferences they may draw
from circumstances construed as exigent. Why these inferences receive special status
remains opaque, especially when one recalls that exigent circumstances alter the
protection afforded the home. In contrast to the more recent judicial approach, Justice
Jackson warned in 1948: "The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is
also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to
dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance."" 4 This structural
contrast between the security of dwelling at home in freedom and the power of law
enforcement to invade the home at their discretion marks a key boundary the Fourth
Amendment's structural purpose is meant to fortify.
For police to have the authority to prevent citizens from destroying particular
items in their possession under an exigent-circumstances rationale means that police
must have a quasi-property interest in finding the items they seek. The magic moment
for transferring rights apparently occurs when police arrive at the door. Moments
before, evidence flushed would be like so much other waste-not a matter to which

the generally worded clauses of the United States Constitution to create a national code that
denies cities sufficient room to experiment with how to grapple with street disorder.").
211. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 468 (2011).
212. See id. at 469-70; see also Crocker, supra note 81, at 716-19.

213. 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
214. Id. at 14.
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the investigatory power of the police applies. But a simple knock on the door
establishes a new order of things the citizen is not free to alter. In this way, a property
interest in the item the police seek becomes shared, as the state now has a property
interest in preserving an item housed in the Fourth Amendment space of the home.25
This situation is an extraordinary transformation of the home's constitutional status.
This situation is also a puzzle. What is unexplained is how the basic property right
to exclude others, 21 6 both from the home and from personal property, fails to apply
when police officers wish to conduct an unauthorized search they fear may be
thwarted. Once officers are lawfully in a place, they may seize property to be used
as evidence, transferring property rights from the occupant to the state. 217 But to
transform property rights-including the right of occupants to exclude the police
from forcible entry-on the subjective desire of police, on their own authority, to
look for something they may not find is a conceptual leap left unjustified.
Nonetheless, the exigency has its roots in common law justifications for possible
forcible entry, warrantless arrest, and searches incident to arrest. 2 18 Authorizing a
warrantless home entry, the Supreme Court first used the exception while observing
that "[s]uspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence, and
no basic constitutional guarantees are violated because an officer succeeds in getting
to a place where he is entitled to be more quickly than he would" 219 after obtaining a
warrant. No doubt a common law property right is not the same as a constitutional
right.2 20 What is more, at least since Katz v. UnitedStates,2 2 1 property interests have
not always determined the scope of privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment,
though the home has always received special constitutional consideration. Moreover,
the Court revived property-based analysis in United States v. Jones.22 2 Even when
the Supreme Court has focused instead on constitutional protections for

215. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309 (1967) (rejecting mere evidence rule
thereby broadening the scope police interest in searches).
216. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that "the
'right to exclude"' is "universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right");
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998)
("[T]he right to exclude others is more than just 'one of the most essential' constituents of
property-it is the sine qua non.") (emphasis in original); Carol M. Rose, Canons ofProperty
Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 632 (1998) ("In its own way, the trope of

exclusive dominion can encourage respect for the claims of others.").
217. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987).
218. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
219. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963) (quoting People v. Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9
(Cal. 1956)).
220. The exception to the warrant requirement entered constitutional doctrine almost in
passing, often referenced in contrast to the nonexigent circumstances under review. See Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1963) ("[T]he Government claims no
extraordinary circumstances-such as the imminent destruction of vital evidence, or the need
to rescue a victim in peril .... "); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958) (finding
that in this case no claim was being made "that the person to be arrested is fleeing or attempting
to destroy evidence"); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951) (finding "no question
of . . imminent destruction, removal, or concealment of the property intended to be seized").
221. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
222. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
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"expectations of privacy,"223 rather than protecting physical places, in actual practice,
privacy often exists only where a property right can be found.22 The home has
retained its status as "first among equals"22 within constitutional protections that
recognize its special sanctity.2 2 6 Yet, even if suspects have no constitutional right to
destroy what they have a property right to discard, it does not follow that police
should have the authority to prevent affectation of either the property or privacy right.
With the background principle of the home's sanctity combined with the
institutional role the home plays, a seeming paradox emerges from the Court's
exigency doctrine, particularly as it is manifest in King. Prior to the search-a search
police are not legally authorized to conduct absent a warrant or exigency-the issue
is whether a police interest extends into the interior of the home, limiting the actions
occupants may take regarding their property. When police arrive at a door to engage
in a consensual citizen encounter, they have neither a warrant nor exigency. In this
situation, privacy has not been breached, yet a government property interest takes
priority within the home. Privacy interests only arise in relation to a search. Because
the police seek to converse at the door of the home, not to execute an authorized
search, then, as the Court made clear in King, no Fourth Amendment privacy interest
is implicated. Nonetheless, actions police might "objectively" perceive as an attempt
to destroy items for which they would like consent to search become the trigger
justifying the search in circumstances they interpret as exigent. The knock on the
door announcing a desire for consensual conversation may not implicate individual
privacy under the Court's approach in King, but it does implicate both the liberty and
property rights of those inside. It also implicates the structural role of the home.
Such an exigent-circumstance exception, elevated to a rule that police may enter
without a warrant when they fear evidence may be destroyed, changes constitutional
meaning, creating a police entitlement out of a prior limitation. Such a rule also
dispenses with the need to balance the privacy interests of residential occupants
against the particular circumstances the police face,2 2 7 incorporating without further
analysis supposed "ample protection for the privacy rights that the Amendment
protects"2 2 8 by allowing police to conduct searches of a home on their own authority.
Despite the special sanctity said to inhabit the home, perceived need to render

223. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.") (citations omitted).
224. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths andthe Casefor Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809-10 (2004).

225. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) ("[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment,
the home is first among equals.").
226. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (acknowledging "the overriding
respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins
of the Republic").
227. The severity of the crime can no longer matter either, overruling sub silentio the
Court's holding in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (holding warrantless entry
to preserve evidence of minor offense does not fall within exigent circumstance exception), to
which the majority opinion in King does not cite.
228. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011).
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emergency assistance or fear of imminent destruction of evidence extend policing
practice into the home's interior.
What makes the growth of this exigency exception authorizing unwarranted home
intrusions possible is the absence of any consideration of the institutional role of the
home. This altered relationship of the citizen and the police with regard to property
rights within the home occurs only because of discretionary decisions law
enforcement officers make. In this way, a separation of powers tension arises
between the home's structural role as a check on government power and law
enforcement claims that necessity requires access to the household interior. A
doctrine without grounding, this exigency exception spins free from any
consideration of the underlying Fourth Amendment values and purposes that animate
the home's constitutional status. In King, individuals must confront police at the
home's threshold free from any further institutional weight that would
counterbalance the hollow claim that an officer's knock at the door is no different
than any other. Lacking heft, the individual's circumstance is too easily outweighed
in balance to the seeming reasonableness of the officer's action. But if this Article's
thesis holds, then the analysis in King must remain an outlier, for it fails to accord
appropriate weight to the institutional role household privacies play in creating the
space from which communities of democratic participants reside and in which
government officials may not become a dominant presence. To make this case, it is
important to see how the institutional home does not rely upon the Fourth
Amendment alone-subject to its exigency exceptions-but is a place in which other
constitutional provisions converge. Most notably, First Amendment free speech
protections and the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause each bolster the
structural distinction of the home as the next section explains.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERGENCE

Fourth Amendment beginnings, grounded in Lord Camden's protection of the
home, tethered concern with tyranny to invasions of the home's sanctity. Separation
of powers concerns that a central government might have too much power were to
be checked at the door of the people's houses. This separation of power recognizes
that the household plays a pre-existing political role within constitutional structure,
one that organizes and secures the liberties of personal and social life free from
government control. In this way, the Fourth Amendment sounds in individual
liberties-freedom from unwarranted search and seizure of the person and home, for
example-but functions as a structural check. This structure is physically and
organizationally located in the home.
A. Household Liberties under Due Process
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas begins with a convergence of
constitutional arguments, making novel structural claims about the relationship
between the home, liberty, and the State:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into
a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
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presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the
person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.2 2 9
This close connection between liberty and privacy provides constitutional
grounds for viewing liberty-not simply privacy-as a central Fourth Amendment
value. 230 As important as this shift towards analyzing the effects on liberty more
broadly can be for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy's Lawrence
opinion makes both rights-based and structural claims. While liberty protects against
intrusions into a "dwelling," a structural limit provides an established "tradition" that
"the State is not omnipresent in the home." 231 This latter observation about tradition
and the home in addition to the reference of "spatial bounds" suggests that what is at
stake under the Due Process Clause converges with what is at stake under the Fourth
Amendment: a structural concern for separating the power of government into its
proper sphere by recognizing the institutional role of the home as the repository of
interpersonal freedom.
Whether by being "omnipresent" or a "dominant presence" in the home, the
State's role is circumscribed by an anti-tyranny purpose manifest in this
constitutional convergence of due process and Fourth Amendment protections. This
anti-tyranny purpose provides a separation of powers check against state action taken
on the household's distinct institutional sphere and limits discretionary despotic
power wielded against "unpopular" groups based upon their status. Justice
Kennedy's introduction to the Lawrence opinion reads like a search and seizure case
even though it holds that laws seeking to criminalize the status of intimate relations
because they are comprised of same-sex couples violate the liberty protected by due
process. 232 By placing protection for the dignity and status of intimate relations that
persons are free to choose at the center of this convergence, 233 Justice Kennedy's
opinion aligns the institutional role of the home as repository of privacy and liberty
with its role at the center of family life. Arguing that the State lacks the power to
define the meaning of personal relationships, the Court protects the right of persons
to choose their intimate relationships within the "confines of their homes and their
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons."234
The Due Process Clause has consistently provided protection for the dignity and
autonomy of family and household life. With early twentieth-century cases such as

229. 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
230. Thomas P. Crocker, The PoliticalFourthAmendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 303, 37178 (2010); see, e.g., Crocker, supra note 26, at 32-48. Government dominance in the home

implicates other values include dignity. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy,
89 GEo. L.J. 2087, 2092 (2001) ("To equate privacy with dignity is to ground privacy in social
forms of respect that we owe each other as members of a common community.").
231. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.

232. Id. at 567 ("The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without
being punished as criminals.").
233. Id.; see also Crocker, supra note 26, at 32-48.
234. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
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Meyer v. Nebraska forming the background, 23 5 the Court maintains a tradition of
treating the home as a special place where liberty of choice in household matters,
including the education of children, prevents government from imposing
"restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence to both letter and spirit
of the Constitution." 23 6 Although these early cases fall within a now-discredited
Lochner-eraconception of substantive due process, 237 they form a still-valid tradition
recognizing the special constitutional role that household life plays. Beyond rights to
control child-rearing and education, the Court also recognized constitutional rights
to custody and childbearing, each central features of family life that the home
shelters. In the wake of Griswold v. Connecticut, this tradition is grounded in the Due
Process Clause, while recognizing the convergence of other constitutional provisions
that protect the privacy of intimate relations and choices within the home. 23 8
Griswold, notoriously perhaps, situated the privacy right of married couples to
choose whether to bear children in the convergence of constitutional provisions
protecting the home and private life, including the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth
Amendments in addition to the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. 23 9 This
due process jurisprudence protects "choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy,"24 not simply as matters of personal autonomy, but also within social
structures of shared interpersonal relations. Justice Kennedy's focus in Lawrence on
how adults are free to choose their "relationship[s] in the confines of their homes and
their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons" 2 1 makes the
status of relationships a central feature of due process privacy protections. 24 2
Neither the due process conception of liberty nor the privacy right Griswold and
its progeny protect focus on a right held in individual isolation from shared
relationships. Liberty in particular provides protections for the relationships

235. 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding that a state restriction against instruction in the
German language violated due process); see also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (holding state law forbidding parochial education "unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control").
236. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.

237. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that the liberty protected by
due process limits state police power to regulate economic matters); W. Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overturning Lochner and subjecting economic substantive due
process claims to minimum rational review); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 255-382 (1998).

238. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
239. Id. at 484-85; see Reva B. Siegel, How Conflict Entrenchedthe Right to Privacy, 124

YALE L.J.F. 316, 316 (2015) ("Griswold's story demonstrates how conflict over the right to
privacy-one of the most fiercely contested rights in the modern constitutional canon-has
helped to entrench the right to privacy, to make it endure, and to imbue it with evolving
meaning.").

240. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
241. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
242. See Post, supra note 230, at 2092 ("To equate privacy with dignity is to ground

privacy in social forms of respect that we owe each other as members of a common
community."); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1214 (2004).
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constituting a household, or other forms of social organization, as the Court
explained: "[Although] the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it
must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal
relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the
State."2 4 3 Regarding a household comprised of members extending beyond the
nuclear family, the Court reasoned that "the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition," and the family "draw[s] together and participate[s] in the
duties and the satisfactions of a common home." 24 4 The Constitution thereby protects
the sanctity of this common home as well as the choice of family structure it
shelters.245
Other forms of interpersonal relationships outside the home have similar
constitutional status, and the dignity exemplified by those relationships further
bolsters the status of the home. When it comes to associations protected through both
First Amendment freedoms of association and due process in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, the Court explained that "certain kinds of personal bonds have played
a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation" and that they "act as critical
buffers between the individual and the power of the State."2 4 6 The Court further
explained that although "the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty,"
it nonetheless also provides "sanctuary" to the formation of personal relationships
essential to self-determining individuals with public lives rooted in shared
relations.2 4 7 In so doing, the Constitution provides sanctuary for relationships outside
the confines of household intimacy for reasons coextensive with those for protecting
the separate institutional life of the home. Indeed, a protected household need not
shelter a family, as the forms of household composition include the kinds of
interpersonal relations at stake under freedom of association.2 48 And although one
relationship-marriage-has been understood to have institutional status as "a great
public institution, giving character to our whole civil polity,"2 4 9 the home gives
substance to this structural role, no matter the precise constitution of the household.
By protecting the sanctity of the family under the Due Process Clause and the
sanctity of the home under the Fourth Amendment, the Constitution establishes the
home and its inhabitants as a separate institution organizing personal, social, and
political life. This protection extends to the liberty persons have to choose their

243. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S 609, 618 (1984).
244. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 505 (1977).
245. Indeed, citing to an earlier dissent by Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman, which later
framed the reasoning in Griswold, the Court in Moore reasoned: "[H]ere we have not an
intrusion into the home so much as on the life which characteristically has its place in the
home .

..

. The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of

that life is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the
principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right." Moore, 431 U.S. at 503,
n.12 (alteration in original) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
246. 468 U.S. at 618-19.
247. Id. at 618.
248. On the diversity of household composition, see ELLLCKSON, supra note 114.
249. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (1888).
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marital partner in establishing the marital household. When states seek to deprive
same-sex couples of the ability to marry, they "disrespect and subordinate them" in
ways that "burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and . .. abridge central precepts
of equality." 2 0 Similarly, as the Court explained in United States v. Windsor, when
the federal government refused to recognize same-sex marriages some states deemed
"worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages," 251 it exercised
its power "to degrade or demean" and "to disparage and to injure" marriages a State
"sought to protect in personhood and dignity." 2 2 In so doing, Congress deprived
persons of both liberty and equality. Similarly, in protecting marital choice in
Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court explained that "marriage is 'the foundation of the
family and of society,"' 25 3 making any attempt to deny the liberty and equality to
some all the more inimical to an institution that serves as "a building block of our
national community."2 " This "building block" organizes social life through choices
individuals make about their intimate relations, with implications for child-rearing
and other social functions. In addition, this "building block" provides institutional
structure for the life of a sovereign people.
These dual purposes-rights and structure-enhance the constitutional role of the
home as institution. When it comes to dual constitutional roles, Heather Gerken
argues that "[t]he key to understanding Windsor is to recognize that the ends of
equality and liberty are served by both rights and structure." 2 5 Congress's Defense
of Marriage Act withheld federal recognition from same-sex marriages authorized
by state law, creating a federalism conflict. 2 6 Although the structural issue in
Windsor was federalism, the effect of a conflict between federal and state law
regarding the status of same-sex marriage was to enhance "the ways in which
federalism and rights work together to promote change." 2 7 What Gerken calls the
"interlocking gears" of rights and structure allow for different ways that dissent and
discursive dialogue can lead to legal change, both by making available local avenues
for legal contestation and by providing rights protections for transformative
advocacy. 258 The First Amendment alone, for example, only guarantees an absence
of legal impediments to speaking, not that one have a venue for making one's speech
effective in the world. 2 9 In order to have practical effect, advocates often find local

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015).
570 U.S. 744, 769 (2013).
Id. at 774-75.
576 U.S. at 669 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
Id.

255. Heather K. Gerken, Windsor's

Mad Genius: The

Interlocking Gears of Rights and

Structure, 95 B.U. L. REv. 587, 594 (2015); see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K.
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 125840 (2009) (federalism

structure also plays a dual role in facilitating both dissent and cooperation, or cooperation
through dissent).
256. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 752.
257. Gerken, supra note 255, at 594.
258. Id. at 594-600.
259. Id. at 595 ("The most difficult problem for political outliers these days isn't getting
their message out; it's getting their message across. The marriage equality movement needed
what all dissenters need to get their ideas into the national mix-a chance to push its issue on
the agenda and force the majority to engage."); see also Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by
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political avenues more fruitful, which in turn can prod the national agenda. What is
achieved locally can be constitutionally significant nationally. In addition, the
relationships the institutional household shelters make possible public political
participation having both local and national effects. Equality and liberty not only
protect same-sex couples in the dignity and respect for their choice of intimate
relations but also the distinctive institutional role of the home that shelters them.
Protection for the intimate relationships constituting a home also provides the basic
structural "building blocks" for the national community.
Rights against the State being a dominant presence in the home also facilitate the
institutional building blocks through which the sovereign people organize their lives.
If the State becomes a dominant presence in the home, and within the relationships
it shelters, then the State can control the forms of life from which the people organize
their political lives and thereby play their separate constitutional role as sovereigns
and voters. Due process protections for intimate relationships serve this broader, and
yet subtler, purpose of separating the representative governors from the people
themselves. In this way, protection for individual liberties locks gears, as Gerken
suggests, with protections for structural separation. 260 In both cases an anti-tyranny
goal is served through the dual function of rights and structure.2 61
Recognizing these interlocking roles of rights and structure highlights the dual
function of the home's constitutional role-as the institutional home for "We the
People"2 62 and as a sphere of privacy. Within these interlocking roles, as we have
seen, there is an overlap between the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause, each of which contests any government effort to become
a "dominant presence" in the home. Such contestation does not merely seek to
preserve a zone of liberty but also to facilitate the home's structural role. Other
provisions of the Constitution converge upon this interlocking role as well. In
particular, the First Amendment, often thought to facilitate deliberative democracy
in the public sphere, also protects the distinctive role of the home.
B. FirstAmendment Speech Indoors and Out
Free speech receives constitutional protection in part because of its interpersonal
role as a necessary condition for deliberative democracy. Without deliberation on
matters of public concern and without protection for "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen"2 63 public debate, which at times can become raucous and cacophonous, 2 6 4 the
American experiment in self-government would not be possible. In this respect,
deliberation can encompass both the orderly debate of the public assembly depicted

Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745 (2005) (exploring ways that disaggregated decision making
can also provide avenues for dissent).
260. Gerken, supranote 255, at 595.
261. See Huq, supra note 30, at 144-46; see also, Thomas P. Crocker,

Who

Decides on

Liberty?, 44 CONN. L. REv. 1511, 1539-43 (2012) (explaining the anti-tyranny purpose of
separation of powers protections for liberty).
262. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
263. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
264. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("That the air may at times seem filled
with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.").
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by Norman Rockwell's painting of free speech as well as the less temperate public
protest. Dissent and discussion are central values the First Amendment protects-the
more inclusive and robust, the better. 2 5
These interactive values exist alongside another strand of First Amendment
jurisprudence that focuses on the autonomy of the individual speaker. 266 When
focusing on speech and speaker, the value of free speech becomes a matter of the
individual's capacity for self-expression and for the expression of a person's ideas
free from any regulation of their content. 267 Under this rendering, the key feature of
free speech is its protection of individual liberty to speak, no matter the content. A
person's liberty to speak need not be connected to audience or place since the
protection falls upon the speech as such rather than on the interactive speech-act.
When combined with the imagery of a "marketplace of ideas," the focus is upon
every individual's ideas being afforded the opportunity to gain acceptance in the
marketplace, analogous with the buying and selling of any other ware in public. 2 8
These dual free speech values reproduce a similar structure of values operative
under due process and the Fourth Amendment, particularly in their protections for
the home. 26 9 In both cases, we examined how privacy and liberty are simultaneously
individual and interpersonal. 270 Constitutional protections at times extend only to the
isolated individual and at other times apply to shared relationships within social
structures. Replicating this structural division, at times First Amendment protections

265. See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA
91 (1999) ("Free Speech theory should be taken beyond protecting or tolerating dissent: the
First Amendment should be taken to reflect a constitutional commitment to promoting
dissent." (emphasis in original)); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH
IN WARTIME (2004).

266. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 573 (1995) (noting "the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment [is]
that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message"); C. Edwin Baker,
Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 979, 998 (1997) ("[L]iberty is a (legal)
capacity to make choices about behavior."); David A. Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy, and
Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 335 (1991) (arguing that freedom of speech

is designed to protect autonomy and that "the government may not suppress speech on the
ground that the speech is likely to persuade people to do something that the government
considers harmful").
267. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 266, at 990 ("The speaker typically views her own
expression as a manifestation of autonomy; the speech presents or embodies her values.");
Robert Post, Managing Deliberation: The Quandary of Democratic Dialogue, 103 ETHICS

654, 672 (1993) ("Citizenship thus presupposes the attribution of freedom. The ascription of
autonomy is in this sense the transcendental precondition for the possibility of democratic selfdetermination."); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593
(1982) (arguing that the central First Amendment value is "individual self-realization").
268. Focus on protecting a "marketplace of ideas" owes its origin to Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("free trade in ideas"). See also Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment
to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail."). See
generally Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REv. 1 (2004)

(exploring the significance of the "marketplace" metaphor).
269. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); Crocker, supra note 26, at 56-67.
270. See supra Section IIlA.
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exist for the individual speaker and speech and at other times for the success of
interpersonal debate within democratic structures. The one protection is for the
isolated individual and the other is for shared interpersonal and social relations.
Within this dual role, the home is a place of special First Amendment protectionfrom the airwaves that enter the home, to the privacy it protects, to the structural
limits of law enforcement reach-the home has a distinctive First Amendment role.
In order to engage in public debate, persons must be able to receive ideas and have
a space for considering whether to adopt or reject them. In this respect, the Court's
opinion in Stanley v. Georgia explains how the home and speech are connected, for
a person has "the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy
of his own home," which includes "the right to be free from state inquiry into the
contents of his library." 27 1 A right to access information serves the dual purpose of
facilitating an individual's development as an autonomous person and enabling a
person to become informed about issues and ideas to better participate in deliberative
self-government. In this way, a "right to receive information and ideas ... is
fundamental to our free society." 272 Such reception needs a protected place, which in
the case of Stanley, is a home, "[fjor also fundamental is the right to be free, except
in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's
privacy."2 73 The home provides an "added dimension"2 74 to the right to receive
information, because it shelters not only rights to speak and to privacy but also it
serves an essential structural role in facilitating shared self-governance.
When law enforcement rummages through the contents of a person's library in
order to discover grounds for an obscenity prosecution, as occurred in Stanley, there
is a notable similarity to foundational Fourth Amendment English cases when crown
officials searched personal papers looking to find evidence for seditious libel
prosecutions. 275 These searches tread upon constitutional protections for freedom of
speech, which includes the freedom to possess and consume the reading and viewing
materials used to spread ideas. Making this connection between constitutional
protections against searches and for speech clear, the Court in Stanley cites to Justice
Brandeis's important dissent in Olmstead v. United States.2 76 Justice Brandeis
dissented in an early wiretapping case, reasoning from the values of both privacy and
intellectual freedom.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only
a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against

271. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
272. Id. at 564.
273. Id.

274. Id.
275. See Solove, supra note 12, at 132-38; William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Originsof
CriminalProcedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 396-99 (1995).

276. 277 U.S. 438, 471-78 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
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the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
277
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Justice Brandeis's connection between the First Amendment value of free thought
and the Fourth Amendment protection for the comprehensive right to be let alone
establishes a convergent purpose behind these related constitutional values. 278
Moreover, in Mapp v. Ohio, which began as a First Amendment case, the Court
established the exclusionary rule as a remedy applicable to states for violations of
the Fourth Amendment under facts similar to Stanley.2 79 Police broke into a home
and "searched a dresser, a chest of drawers, a closet and some suitcases . . . [and]
looked into a photo album and through personal papers belonging to the
appellant,"280 as well as a trunk in the basement, until they discovered items they
sought to use in an obscenity prosecution. In excluding the evidence, the Court
averred to the systemic effects of doing otherwise, reasoning that "[t]he ignoble
shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest." 281 This
convergence of privacy and speech functions not merely to protect the individual but
to uphold institutional separation of powers.
Avoiding clause-bound analysis in Olmstead,28 2 Justice Brandeis, as Justice
Kennedy later did in Lawrence,213 connected the rights-protective provisions of
speech, thought, and privacy to the special status afforded the home as an institutional
check against government officials by a self-governing people. 284 A "most
comprehensive" and "most valued" right, being let alone respects the separate
institutional spheres of home and public life in which respect for the former, under
the First Amendment, becomes a necessary ("favorable") condition for the proper
functioning of the latter. 2 5
This power to exclude intrusions upon one's right to be let alone extends to
unwanted speech in the First Amendment context. A line of cases affirms that

277. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
278. Seana Shiffrin argues that the value of thinking itself is a core First Amendment value.
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-BasedApproach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 283 (2011).

279. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
280. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 645.
281. Id. at 660.
282.

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 12

(1980) (noting the problem of "clause-bound" interpretation); see also AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 13 (1997) ("History also

reveals strong linkages between the Fourth and Seventh Amendments that previous clausebound scholarship about each amendment in isolation has overlooked.").
283. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
284. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.

285. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our
independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their
faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.");
Crocker, supra note 60, at 344-45; Solove, supra note 12, at 132-38.
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although a speaker might have a right to express ideas, an audience-particularly one
located at home-has no reciprocal obligation to receive them.28 6 Indeed, the Court
has upheld the institutional authority of the householder to bar unwanted speakers
and speech from the home.28 7 This power exists in recognition of the "ancient concept
that 'a man's home is his castle' into which 'not even the king may enter' has lost
none of its vitality"2 88 when it comes to the First Amendment. This adage reflects the
institutional separation between the household and seat of government. When in the
public sphere, a person subject to unwanted speech can "effectively avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes" 289 or stopping their
ears, because in the marketplace one expects the hurly-burly of a vigorous freespeech culture. 290 Even then, however, if "the degree of captivity makes it impractical
for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure," 291 as the Court explained,
then government may move to protect the "captive audience" against unwanted
speech. 292 By harnessing the power of government to preserve the home from
unwanted intrusion against other speakers, the Court conjoins Justice Brandeis's
"right to be let alone" with the idea that the home has a distinctive place in our
constitutional system. 293
Self-government is only possible through the preservation of a robust public
sphere, where citizens can come together to engage in what Justice Holmes termed
the "free trade in ideas." 294 Indeed, the Court has repeatedly explained the principle
that "[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." 295 To do this, public
debate must occur in a public place, for "[p]ublic places are of necessity the locus
for discussion of public issues . . . . At the heart of our jurisprudence lies the principle
that in a free nation citizens must have the right to gather and speak with other

286. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) ("[W]e have repeatedly held
that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that
the government may protect this freedom."); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949)
(protecting households from sound trucks).
287. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (noting "the
homeowner himself' has power to determine "whether distributors of literature may lawfully
call at a home"); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-39 (1970) (upholding
homeowner's authority to block receipt of unwanted mail).
288. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737.
289. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
290. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) ("The right to free speech, of course,
includes the right to attempt to persuade others to change their views, and may not be curtailed
simply because the speaker's message may be offensive to his audience.").
291. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
292. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974) (employing captive
audience doctrine).
293. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (protecting "the privacy of the
home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment
rights of an intruder").
294. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
295. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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persons in public places." 296 This public forum principle supports practices of
democratic self-governance that preserve the value of political dissent, as Justice
Brandeis also explained in his concurrence in Whitney v. Calfornia: "[D]iscussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine;
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government." 297 Yet, dissent also requires the development of ideas through the kind
of thought and reflection that the home shelters and makes possible. 298 Without a
public forum, dissent would have no place to realize its role in deliberative selfgovernment. 299 But without the home, it would have no place to shelter. In this way,
and through the two opinions of Justice Brandeis covering both the First and Fourth
Amendments, we can trace the causal connection between the institutional role of
the home and the public role "We the People" play in directing the machinery of selfgovernment.
This dual role-domestic and public-is on display in the 1972 case UnitedStates
v. U.S. District Court (Keith) involving systemic domestic surveillance of anti-war
groups.30 0 Federal officials claimed that because the surveillance was conducted for
national security purposes, the usual Fourth Amendment procedures did not apply.3 01
Because the surveillance targets were dissenters suspected of engaging in subversive
activities threatening to national security, the government claimed that no warrant
was required.3 0 2 In rejecting these claims, the Court connected the home with the
public sphere, announcing first that protection from such surveillance of the home is
"chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."3 03 But
the Court further explained that this protection is not limited to a narrow domestic
privacy right, however, for
[t]he price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to
an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized
official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of

296. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 193 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The right to speak can flourish only if it is
allowed to operate in an effective forum-whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town
meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television frequency.").
297. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
298. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 265, at 91-93.

"

299. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (noting that public
fora "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions"); Thomas P. Crocker, DisplacingDissent: The Role of "Place
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government action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less
than open public discourse, is essential to our free society.3 04
In this way, the Court linked household privacy to public debate in a case involving
warrantless wiretapping and surveillance of dissenters' homes, creating what the
Court described as "a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values." 3 05
This convergence, like the convergence of Fourth Amendment and due process
considerations, has both structural anti-tyranny and individual liberty purposes. In
the wake of the disclosures provided by Edward Snowden regarding the National
Security Agency's surveillance programs that included bulk collection of all
Americans' telephone metadata and the content collection of Americans' voice,
email, internet search histories, and video communications with persons abroad,
including some purely domestic communications, Americans faced a similar
situation to those reflected in the Keith case. 306 They learned through this leak that
much of domestic life reflected in activities conducted within the home, or from
home to home, were subject to widespread surveillance under the guise of national
security necessity, and either outside the bounds of existing statutory authorization
or the product of strained and tendentious statutory readings. 307 And though no
Supreme Court cases follow Keith in clarifying further the scope of Fourth
Amendment privacy against such activity, 3 08 President Obama did acknowledge the
convergence of constitutional issues of domestic and public life, admonishing in a
speech:

[I]n the 1960s, government spied on civil rights leaders and critics of the
Vietnam War. And partly in response to these revelations, additional
laws were established in the 1970s to ensure that our intelligence
capabilities could not be misused against our citizens. In the long,
twilight struggle against Communism, we had been reminded that the
very liberties that we sought to preserve could not be sacrificed at the
09
altar of national security. 3

304. Id. at 314.
305. Id. at 313.
306.
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CROCKER,

Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33

(D.D.C. 2013); ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER, supra note 45.

308. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing
because they could not show that they were targets of a surveillance program because factual
details remained secret); see also ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F. 3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding bulk
metadata collection program exceeded statutory authorization and raising Fourth Amendment
concerns).
309. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of
Signals Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press[https://perma.cc/6ARHoffice/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence
8KBE]. President Obama also connected surveillance to activities protected by a convergence
of constitutional protections, observing, "Having faced down the dangers of totalitarianism
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Privacy is not a protected value in the home because of the isolation from public
affairs it affords. Too often, privacy is treated as a value equivalent to secrecy.3 1 0 If
information is shared, as the Supreme Court reasons under its third-party doctrine,
then its accessibility to others renders it no longer private and protected. 1 1 Such a
view is a mistake, particularly in a modern age of social sharing.3 1 2 Instead, privacy
in the home is protected in part because it is a necessary condition for public life,
giving it a distinctive constitutional role. As we saw in the case of Riley, extension
of household privacy into public realms does not alter the nature of the information
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 313 Similarly, even though the First
Amendment's protections for free speech may be principally aimed at "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open" public debate,3 1 4 the right to receive ideas at home is
nonetheless an essential part of that debate. What matters is not the descriptive
features of the location-whether at a public place or at home-but the institutional
role activities within it play. When we clarify the home's equal role in facilitating
consideration of ideas, fostering public debate, and protecting intimate relations, it
becomes possible to protect the home's broader role within a constitutional system.
In this way, privacy protections support the institutional powers of the sovereign
people separate from the formal institutions of representative government.
IV. WHY THE HOME MATTERS TO CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Why does focus on the home matter to the Constitution? For one, despite what
might have been widespread criticism of the Court's use of "core" and "penumbral"
meanings of a right in Griswold,3 15 constitutional law does implement both paradigm
and marginal cases. Finding in the home a paradigm-and explaining why-can be
useful for proper understanding of the scope of the Fourth Amendment. But as a
paradigm of privacy, there is reason to be cautious, because it might undermine many
features of interpersonal life lived outside of the home as deserving less protection
because they are less private. The way out of this difficulty, as I have argued, is to
recognize that the home is not merely a protected place but a separate institution. As
an organizing institution, the home is a paradigm not of withdrawn privacy but of
public purpose. Protecting it is a right of "the people"-a term the Constitution uses
to designate a political body, not atomistic individuals. 316 It organizes and shelters

and fascism and communism, the world expects us to stand up for the principle that every
person has the right to think and write and form relationships freely-because individual
freedom is the wellspring of human progress." Id.
310. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him
to Government authorities." (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976))); see
also DANIEL
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SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 21-24 (2008)

"privacy as secrecy").
311. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 744; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
312. See Crocker, supra note 26, at 48-56.

313. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401-03 (2014).
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the intimate relations, reflective consideration, and idea formation necessary for the
robust deliberative democracy upon which the American republic depends. The
Fourth Amendment makes the home a paradigm because of these institutional roles,
not merely because it is also a place of physical shelter.
The home matters for another reason, as this Article argues, because it is a place
where intimate relations converge with public purposes to form a structural
institution of constitutional governance. Preserving this function is a principal
purpose of the convergence of First and Fourth Amendment protections. It is also a
reason to view both rights and structure at work. Protecting the people against
encroachments by executive officials serves a separation of powers purpose. It
ensures a space wherein the people may form and share ideas that will then constitute
the governing priorities of legislative and executive departments. As the Court has
recognized, when government becomes a dominant presence in the home, this proper
direction of authority from the people to other institutions of government is reversed,
a condition indicative of tyranny. 317 In this way, anti-tyranny is a structural issue as
much as one of individual rights.
In light of this structural purpose, questions about access to the home by
government officials must go beyond questions about "reasonable expectations of
privacy"31 to encompass questions about how such access might impact the
structural integrity of this separate institution. Because home life shelters the
sovereign people in their political role, not merely their private capacity, narrow
consideration of what society might "expect" regarding the privacy of a particular
social practice is too narrow a question. What is shared can be exposed for some
purposes and not for others. The taxonomy and texture of privacy need not lead to
an all-or-nothing set of expectations focused on questions of exposure and
accessibility. 319 A constitutional inquiry that does not ask more about social practices
that make information accessible to some others for limited purposes will fail to
account for the broader institutional questions. Yet, at times the Supreme Court has
wielded its third-party doctrine to suggest that limited sharing leads to complete
constitutional exposure. 32 Instead, a more refined understanding of privacy would

317. See supra Section IIA; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948) (explaining
need for a warrant to search a home that "[a]ny other rule . .. would obliterate one of the most
fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law,
and the police-state where they are the law"); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) ("The
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society .... The knock at the door, whether by day or
by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the
police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned .... "); United States
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416-17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment's goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power to and prevent 'a too permeating
police surveillance .... .' (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948))). On the
anti-tyrannical focus of the Court's reasoning in these and related cases, see Crocker, supra
note 47, at 593-603, 624-34.
318. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
319. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479-91 (2006).
320. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) ("This Court consistently
has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties."); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 128 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
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ask what social role do both controlling and sharing of information, relations, and
spaces play within both the personal and the public roles of those that the government
seeks to surveil. 3 2 1 Because Justice Sotomayor has called for a reconsideration of the
third-party doctrine, such an expanded conception of privacy that does more than
protect "expectations" will be necessary not only to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's
foundational concerns but also to remain relevant in new technological settings.3 2 2
Moreover, by asking how a pervasive practice of surveillance impacts institutional
roles, we can better explain why the greater quantity of information at issue in Riley
requires protection. In Riley, as we saw, the Court recognized that the amount of
information available on a smartphone was equivalent to or exceeded what would
otherwise only be available with access to the home.3 23 In so doing, Riley thereby
provided a reason why the quantity of information available on a smartphone
required a Fourth Amendment analysis different than what was provided for other
physical items subject to searches incident to arrest.324 We can make sense of why
this difference matters only by considering the broader institutional roles the home
plays.
Without recognition of the extent of the home's constitutional role-providing a
structural purpose to rights protections-then it may be too easy to erode the status
of the home by being too quick to apply existing doctrine to new technological
settings. Constitutional imagination about how the parts fit together to interlock
rights and structure is an essential feature of constitutional law. Without it,
implementing the Constitution in new technological settings risks profound error. As
the internet of things and the pervasive "smartification" of home technologies
produces more and more data about intimate household activities, 325 there is an
increasing need to have some conceptual clarity about the constitutional status of the
home and household activities-within or beyond its threshold. This conceptual
clarity (or its absence) will be a decisive feature of future Fourth Amendment cases
as law enforcement pressure to gain access to this data builds. Already we see
examples, such as a murder case in Bentonville, Arkansas, in which police sought
data from an Amazon Echo home device.3 26 Police have sought and continue to seek

dissenting) ("If an individual shares information, papers, or places with another, he assumes
the risk that the other person will in turn share access to that information or those papers or
places with the government." (emphasis omitted)).
321. See Thomas P. Crocker, Ubiquitous Privacy, 66 OKLA. L. REv. 791, 792 (2014)
("Questions about how to conceptualize, and thus whether to protect, privacy in the
information persons share with third parties produce different answers if approached from the
perspective of personal identity, rather than from the perspective of law enforcement
practice."); Richards, supra note 39, at 1935.
322. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("More
fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.").
323. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393-97 (2014).
324. See supra Section II.A.
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access to recorded information from Amazon and Google's home devices, including
a case in New Hampshire involving a murder.32 7 Moreover, the proliferation of apps
that track their users and collect their data across portable devices such as phones
and tablets provides ever more data that companies collect, store, and sell, thereby
also making vast quantities of data potentially available to law enforcement
inquiry. 3 2 8 If the third-party doctrine were mechanically applied, the exposure to a
third party holding the records of any transactions that occurred within the home
during a particular time period would render all such material accessible to law
enforcement without Fourth Amendment protection.
Such cases-real and anticipated-highlight the need to have conceptual clarity
about the constitutional issues at stake. If Fourth Amendment privacy is considered
without reference to the values and structures it protects, or the convergences with
due process and free speech it forms, narrow case-specific doctrinal applications risk
under-protecting constitutional values in a pernicious way. 329 If courts mechanically
apply the third-party doctrine to new technologies like smart televisions and in-home
cloud devices such as Amazon Alexa or Google Home, then the Constitution could
be read to permit widespread government surveillance of household activities
because they are shared with third-party providers. Not only would such pervasive
home access be inconsistent with Fourth Amendment foundations and purposes, but
it would be inconsistent with separation of powers structures that limit executive
authority to access the internal deliberations of household participants. The need to
reconsider the third-party doctrine should not arise, however, as a matter of
"protecting information," which is often the conceptual framing.330 Rather, questions
about access to information fail to consider the constitutional role of the home that
forestalls governing officials' access because it risks making the government a

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 12/28/business/amazon-echo-murder-case-arkansas. html
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dominant presence in the home. Household information matters because household
activities matter to constitutional structure.
One alternative approach to the third-party doctrine would be to follow Riley in
conducting a balancing test that weighs the quantity of information available against
claimed government need.33 1 What it means for information to be private, under the
Court's balancing approach, is that personal control over its access overrides an
asserted government need. In this way, balancing always makes government
necessity integral to a legal conception of Fourth Amendment privacy. A place-or
information-is considered private only when government need does not outweigh
its heightened protection. In order for this heightened protection to have greater
weight, the Court has to consider the qualitative roles that retaining control over this
information plays in a person's life, as we saw the Court do in Riley. 33 2 But this
dynamic, which renders all sharing vulnerable to claims of overriding executive
necessity, becomes more complicated when we add consideration of institutional role
to the analysis. Under my approach, privacy also includes a conception of
institutional role serving a structural purpose under the Constitution. To include this
conception requires an analysis of how government access-no matter the degree of
necessity and no matter the outcome of a simple balance-might upset the balance
of powers between the governing officials and the governed sovereigns. Privacy
would limit government access to information when doing so furthers separate
institutional structure in light of the political purposes that convergent rights protect.
The institutional home is more than four walls and a roof. The Constitution does
not speak of protecting shelters or buildings, but of houses. Because the home is not
simply a physical place, the Constitution does not protect it in virtue of its physical
attributes such as its ability to enclose a space. If not physical attributes, then what
must make the home constitutionally salient is its social and political roles-the way
that it fulfills constitutional purposes. Privacy, and its expectations, can tempt
lawyers to focus on the home's physical attributes and the actions occupants have
taken in light of those attributes, such as whether they have closed window blinds.3 3 3
Such inquiries, however, are grounded in a logic of exposure and accessibility
divorced from any consideration of Fourth Amendment purposes. Window blinds do
not merely control the flow of light through a translucent material but provide a way
of occupying a space in which complex social practices exist incompletely protected
by an analysis of expectations. To focus on exposure as a physical feature of homes
misses how household privacy is a matter of the social and political practices that
occur within a space.
Moreover, focusing on the physical attributes of a home has distributional effects,
implying that the Constitution protects some homes more than others.3 34 The home
within an apartment building that police approached in Kentucky v. King has less
privacy than the single-family home police investigated with a canine in Jardines

331. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385-86, 393-94 (2014).
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merely because of the nature of the physical space.335 A household within an
apartment building is more easily accessible, sharing common spaces with other
households. But from the perspective of the institutional role and purpose of
household privacy, such a distributional inequality makes no sense. If we turn our
attention away from the physical attributes of the home to the social and political
roles of the home, then the poorest multi-family dwelling warrants the same
constitutional protection as the richest single-family manse. Both organize the
institutional life of the sovereign people through their household arrangements and
practices. In these ways, household dwellings are more than the sum of their physical
attributes.
CONCLUSION

Focusing on the home is a way of providing analytic purpose to the privacy the
Fourth Amendment protects. In parallel to First Amendment inquiries that ask, "why
speech?" we can similarly ask, "why privacy?" To ask this question goes beyond the
accessibility and exposure inquiry about whether something is private to ask what
value exists in protecting something as private. The home as an institution provides
an organizing principle to say that privacy matters because of the role it plays in selfgovernance. The Fourth Amendment has a personal rights-based role as well as a
structural political role. If police access to the home risks undermining the separate
institutional integrity of the household, whether within the confines of the home's
four walls or in public, then courts should strictly scrutinize the government's
reasons for claiming such access outside of the ordinary probable cause standard.
The same concerns should govern any claimed national security needs to monitor or
access the home through third-party technology providers. Moreover, this approach
is all the more important when it is foreseeable that law enforcement access can be
scaled to become a systematic practice, as occurred with the lowered reasonable
suspicion standard for stops and frisks. In such a case, the inquiry must go beyond
the claimed effects on an individual taken in isolation and must consider the holistic
effects on the social and political experiences of communities subjected to a
pervasive police practice and presence. Thus, when we confront emerging
technologies that involve sharing with third parties, the rules the Court applies do not
affect merely the individual subject to an investigation but also affect the people in
their political capacity, for what is done to an individual will be done to communities
of individuals. Although the judiciary provides grounds for making the constitutional
meaning of the home an effective check against erosion of Fourth Amendment values
and purposes, it also uses exigency doctrines in a way that erodes such protections.
Constitutional vigilance will require imagining new ways of making Fourth
Amendment values relevant to new technology and changing social practices that the
institutional role of the home makes possible.
The meanings of American constitutionalism reside in the ways we understand
and practice constitutional governance through both its empowerments and
limitations. The home matters to the Fourth Amendment because it organizes
institutional structure and constitutional meanings. Because technological and social
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practices render Americans ever more exposed, how we conceptualize the
constitutional convergence of privacy protections will shape the relationship between
the people and their governing representatives. By placing the home's structural role
at the center of the Fourth Amendment's meaning, privacy becomes more than a
matter of personal exposure and government access. Household privacy empowers a
structure of deliberative self-determination, applicable to all, limiting the ability of
executive officials to aggrandize institutional power at the expense of the resident
citizen.

